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The Costs of Dissent:
Protest and Civil Liabilities
Timothy Zick*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the civil costs and liabilities that apply to individuals who organize, participatein, and support protest activities. Costs ranging
from permit fees to punitive damages significantly affect First Amendment
speech, assembly, and petition rights. A variety of common law and statutory
civil claims also apply to protest activities. Plaintiffs have recently filed a number of new civil actions negatively affecting protest, including "negligentprotest," "aiding and abetting defamation," "riot boosting," "conspiracy to
protest," and "tortious petitioning." The labels are suggestive of the threats
these suits pose to First Amendment rights. All of these costs and liabilities
add to an already challenging and burdensome protest environment, which
includes regulatory and other restrictions on speech and assembly. Owing to
their chilling effect on First Amendment rights, courts have a special obligation to review both traditional costs and new civil actions skeptically, to require clarity and precision in terms of liability standards, and to allow civil
liability only in very narrow circumstances. Applying these guidelines, the Article urges courts to reject a number of civil costs and claims as inconsistent
with FirstAmendment precedentsand doctrines, and to review other costs and
liabilities in light of the First Amendment values protest activity serves. Beyond the courts, officials and administratorsshould more carefully consider
the First Amendment implications of the cumulative-and rising-costs of
dissent.
"The rights of politicalassociationarefragile enough without adding the additional threat of destruction by lawsuit."1
"What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal
statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage
awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be
markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute."2

* John Marshall Professor of Government & Citizenship, William & Mary Law School. I
would like to thank Joseph Blocher, Greg Magarian, and Luke Morgan for providing valuable
feedback on an earlier draft of the article.
1 NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
2 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (footnote omitted).
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INTRODUCTION

Commentators have documented the many potential criminal liabilities of protesters. 3 However, civil costs and liabilities also signifi-

cantly affect protest activities. These costs and liabilities take the form
of fees, fines, bonds, civil damages, and other monetary penalties. Protest activities can also lead to other costs, including loss of educational
and employment opportunities. In many instances, the costs of dissent

are borne by groups and individuals unable to absorb them. Separately, and in combination, they may chill or suppress the exercise of
First Amendment rights to speak, assemble, and petition government

officials. 4
The costs and liabilities associated with "protest"-communicating dissent by means ranging from participation in mass protests to
petitioning government officials-are rising.5 The trend coincides with
Americans' increased interest in public protest participation, and with
national protests on matters ranging from immigration, to gender
equality, to racial justice. 6 The extraordinary demonstrations following
the death of George Floyd were a poignant affirmation of the values
of protest to self-government and a culture of dissent. However, mass,
spontaneous protests are a decided exception to the general rules
under which protest activities normally occur.7 Individuals and groups
involved in organizing, participating in, and supporting protest actions, including some of the racial justice and police brutality demon3 See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Defining Peaceably: Policing the Line Between Constitutionally Protected Protest and Unlawful Speech, 80 Mo. L. REv. 961, 964-66 (2015) [hereinafter
Defining Peaceably] (reviewing potential criminal liabilities of protesters). For discussions of
various criminal and other limits on public protest, see generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble:
Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949 (2014); John Inazu,
Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. REv. 2 (2017).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 The Article defines "protest" broadly, in part to highlight the many forms of civil liability that can apply to different kinds of dissent. Protest is not limited to mass or group events. An
individual or small group on a street corner can be engaged in protest, as can the constituent
who reaches out to officials to object to government projects or policies, or the individual who
communicates support for protesters or their causes through words, training, and other actions.
Individuals can also be liable for protest-related costs, including through application of common
law tort liability. These are among the civil costs relating to protest.
6 Mary Jordan & Scott Clement, Rallying Nation: In Reaction to Trump, Millions of
Americans Are Joining Protests and Getting Political, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://

www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/04/06/feature/in-reaction-to-trump-millions-ofamericans-are-joining-protests-and-getting-political [https://perma.cc/39JB-5UNG].
7 For example, as Mark Tushnet has explained, it is nearly "impossible in practice" to
assess costs against those who participate in spontaneous protests. See Mark Tushnet, Spontaneous Demonstrations and the First Amendment, 71 ALA. L. REv. 773, 790 (2020).
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strations, are subject to a range of civil costs and liabilities. Liability
may extend to damages from vandalism and destruction of propertyeven if the organizers did not directly participate in the unlawful acts.
Further, lawmakers have historically reacted to disruptive protests by
8
invoking "law and order" and cracking down on protest activities. In
the recent past, they have proposed a range of enhanced civil penalties for protest and civil disobedience activities. 9 It seems likely this
historical pattern will hold. President Trump and other officials are
explicitly invoking the same "law and order" platform that has precipitated such proposals. 10
Many protest costs fly under the radar. In the administrative
realm, these include permit fees, policing fees, cleanup costs, and liability insurance requirements-burdens that can easily run into the
11
thousands of dollars for even moderately-sized events. As protests
have become more expensive to host and police, federal agencies,
campus officials, and legislators have proposed cost-shifting measures
12
that would increase financial burdens on protesters. Some localities
have sought restitution from protest organizers for trespass and damage to businesses.1 3 As noted, in response to public protests at Presi8 See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Republican Lawmakers Introduce Bills to Curb Protesting in at Least 18 States, WAsH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/24/republican-lawmakers-introduce-bills-to-curb-protesting-inat-least-17-states/ [https://perma.cc/8N9K-29XA].
9 See U.S. Protest Law Tracker, INT'L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFITr L., http://www.icnl.org/
usprotestlawtracker [https://perma.cc/SB2F-535M]; Tracey Yoder, New Anti-Protesting Legislation: A Deeper Look, NAT'L LAws. GuiD (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.nlg.org/new-anti-protesting-legislation-a-deeper-look/ [https://perma.cc/NP9Y-TXFN].
10 See Matt Perez, Trump Tells Governors to 'Dominate' Protesters, 'Put Them in Jailfor
6
10 Years,' FORBES (Jun. 1, 2020, 1:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2020/0 /01/
trump-tells-goverors-to-dominate-protesters-put-them-in-j ail-for-0-years/?sh=5e200213fb99
[https://perma.ccIT7FZ-45NL].
11 See Marissa J. Lang, The Government Might Ask Activists to Repay the Costs of Securing
Protests. Experts Say It Could Price Them Out, WASH. PosT (Sept. 28, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-government-might-ask-activists-to-repay-the-costs-of-secur
ing-protests-experts-say-it-could-price-them-out/2019/09/28/66f7785a-e07b-11e9-8dc8498eabc129a0_story.html [https://perma.cc/6QDL-R64A]; see also Eric Neisser, Charging for
Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEo. L.J. 257 (1985); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (upholding fee that recouped expenses incident to
maintaining order and processing permit). But see Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 133-34 (1992) (striking down statute where fee's amount was largely left to administrator's discretion and depended on likely hostility of audience).
12 See Frederick Schauer, Costs and Challenges of the Hostile Audience, 94 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 1671, 1686 (2019) (reviewing costs associated with recent large-scale protests on campuses and elsewhere).
13 See, e.g., That Free Speech Will Cost You $70,000, DEFENDING RIGHTS & DISSENT (Jan.
7 0 0 00
/ [https://
15, 2015), http://www.rightsanddissent.org/news/that-free-speech-wil-cost-you-
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dent Trump's inauguration, Standing Rock, and in Ferguson, Missouri,
many state legislatures enacted enhanced civil penalties for protestrelated activities, including minor acts of civil disobedience.14 All of
these measures can significantly chill or even suppress First Amendment activities.

Damage awards resulting from civil causes of action, which also
involve lawyers' fees and court costs (not to mention personal time
and effort), represent a particularly concerning threat to protest. Public protest organizers and participants may incur civil liability under a
variety of common law torts including public and private nuisance,
trespass, defamation, and interference with business relations. 15
Protesters who block speakers from going to scheduled events may be
liable for false imprisonment, obstructing free passage, battery, assault, and interference with advantageous relations. 16 Under federal
and state laws, protesters may be liable for enhanced civil penaltiesincluding punitive damages.1 7 They may also incur civil liability pursuant to statutes prohibiting threatening communications, harassment,

and other conduct.18
Plaintiffs have upped the civil liability ante. In a recent case, a
police officer injured when an unknown assailant at a Black Lives
Matter protest threw a rock at him filed a negligence suit against the
protest organizer, DeRay Mckesson.1 9 In his complaint, the officer
claims that Mckesson is liable for his injuries because they were a
perma.cc/CUU6-4GG9] (reporting that district attorney in Oakland is seeking $70,000 in restitution to cover police and emergency services in relation to a chain-in at a BART station in November 2014).
14 See Ingraham, supra note 8.
15 See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1258, 1261-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs had pleaded necessary elements of nuisance claim
against anti-abortion protesters).
16 See Schauer, supra note 12, at 1693-94 (discussing potential common law actions against
a "hostile audience").
17 See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil Disobedience:
Clarifying the Free Speech Clause Model to Bring the Social Value of PoliticalProtest into the
Balance, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 185 (1998); Huffman & wright Logging Co. v. wade, 857 P.2d. 101,
111 (Or. 1993) (in banc) (upholding punitive damages award in connection with environmental
protest involving trespass to chattels tort).
18 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding civil verdict under federal access to
clinics statute for communicating threats to abortion providers).
19 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d. 818, 822-23 (5th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court vacated the
Fifth Circuit's decision on the ground that it should have clarified the extent of underlying state
tort liability before deciding whether to allow the "negligent protest" theory to proceed. See
Mckesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51 (2020) (per curiam). The Court remanded for further proceedings. Id.
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20
foreseeable consequence of Mckesson's negligent protest planning.

Under this "negligent protest" theory, protest organizers are liable for
damages stemming from violent acts even if they did not personally

engage in, direct, authorize, or ratify them. 21 To appreciate the implications of this cause of action, one need look no further than the pub-

lic protests that rocked Minneapolis, Chicago, and many other cities
following the death of George Floyd. 22 Under a "negligent protest"
theory, if authorities can identify them, the protest organizers would

be liable for all foreseeable damages that occurred during mass demonstrations-including those caused by the unlawful acts of counter23
protesters and agitators not associated with a group or movement.
A similar cause of action, "riot boosting," emerged from recent

protest-related state legislation. 24 This action provides that anyone

who trains, supports, or advocates on behalf of a public protest that
later results in violence is liable for damages caused by the violent
activity. 25 Like "negligent protest," the "riot boosting" action imposes
civil liability without proof that the defendant directly committed any
violent activity or intended that others commit it.26
In another troubling lawsuit, bakery owners in an Ohio town

charged with racism in their dealings with student customers sued
Oberlin College for defamation. 27 The plaintiffs alleged that Oberlin
employees facilitated or "aided and abetted" the students' protest by
providing facilities that students used to print flyers accusing the
20 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d. at 826-27.
21 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) ("Civil liability may
not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which
committed acts of violence.").
22 See Brian Dakss, Audrey McNamara, Victoria Albert & Justin Carissimo, George Floyd
U.S. Protests Live Updates from June 1, 2020, CBS NEwS, (June 2, 2020, 6:39 AM), https://
6
2
www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/george-floyd-death-protests-minneapolis- 020-0 -01/ [https://
perma.cc/44M9-JD8G].
23 See Tony Mauro, Nationwide Protests May Resound in Supreme Court FirstAmendment
Case, NAT'L L.J. (June 9, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/06/09/
[https://perma.cc/
nationwide-protests-may-resound-in-supreme-court-first-amendment-case/
QY58-BYYA].
24 See Andrew Malone & Vera Eidelman, The South Dakota Legislature Has Invented a
New Legal Term to Target Pipeline Protesters, ACLU (April 1, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://www.aclu.

org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/south-dakota-legislature-has-invented-new-legal-term-target [https://perma.cc/NZ7L-U39Y].
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 See EJ Dickson, How a Small-Town Bakery in Ohio Became a Lightning Rod in the
Culture Wars, ROLLING STONE (July 18, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/
culture-features/oberlin-gibson-bakery-protest-defamation-suit-controversy-culture-war-850404/
[https://perma.cc/R5Z9-8VRN].
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bakery owner of racism and, in one case, by attending a protest
outside the bakery. 28 A jury returned a $44 million verdict against

Oberlin College for "aid[ing] and abet[ing]" the students' alleged defamatory statements.2 9
Other novel civil claims are currently making their way through
the courts. For example, a group of plaintiffs who attended the infamous "Unite the Right" protests in Charlottesville, Virginia during
the summer of 2017 sued the organizers of those protests under a federal civil rights law enacted to protect the equality rights of newly
freed slaves. 30 In their complaint, plaintiffs' "conspiracy" claim relies
extensively on various actions and statements related to organizing
and publicizing the Charlottesville protests.31 There may well be suffi-

cient evidence to sustain this claim against the white supremacists who
marched in Charlottesville. However, like the "riot boosting" law, a
"conspiracy to protest" theory could make it an actionable civil wrong
for anyone to organize a lawful protest at which violent activity later

occurred.
The scope of protesters' civil liabilities continues to expand. A
state appeals court recently upheld a $4 million jury verdict against a
citizen who petitioned local officials to abandon a storm water project
she believed would harm the environment. 32 The court held the petitioner was liable for the damages suffered by the business entities that
stood to profit from the project.33 This appears to be the first decision
to hold a speaker liable for "tortious petitioning."
As if all this were not burden enough, protest activity could also
result in loss of educational or employment opportunities. Elementary
and secondary school children may face discipline for even off-campus
protest activities 3 4 University students may also be subject to discipli-

nary measures, including possible expulsion, for engaging in certain
28

Id.

Id.
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 (w.D. Va. 2018)
(denying motion to dismiss federal civil rights claims against organizers of "Unite the Right"
protest in Charlottesville, Virginia).
31 See Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 773-74.
32 See Hurchalla v. Lake Point Phase I, LLC, 278 So. 3d 58, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
(upholding judgment).
33 See Patricia Mazzei, The Florida Activist is 78. The Legal Judgment Against Her Is $4
Million., N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/us/maggy-hurchalaflorida-mining.html [https://perma.cc/9JKA-X4VL].
34 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 403 (2007) (upholding student discipline
in connection with display of "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner, but suggesting that protests on
matters of public concern such as the legality of marijuana would be protected speech).
29
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kinds of disruptive protest on or off campus. 35 Many universities have
adopted stricter disciplinary measures for students who disrupt speakers and engage in other forms of dissent. 36 Finally, public employees
may face termination or other adverse consequences for participating
in public protests and other protest activities. 37
The chilling effect of these costs and liabilities on First Amendment protest rights cannot be overstated. Historically, plaintiffs have
used civil liability as a means of suppressing protest and dissent. During the civil rights era, plaintiffs used defamation lawsuits and other
forms of civil liability to suppress reporting about civil rights protests. 38 Until the Supreme Court finally intervened, opponents of desegregation effectively weaponized civil liability to undermine the
exercise of First Amendment rights. 39 The effort today is less coordinated, but just as concerning. Imagine, for example, that opponents of
desegregation and racial equality had been able to resort to "negligent
protest" or "aiding and abetting defamation" actions during the civil
rights movement.
This Article provides a holistic account of the civil costs and liabilities that apply to protest activities. It seeks to reconcile the rising
costs of dissent with a commitment to speech, assembly, and petition
rights as well as core First Amendment values. Part I describes the
array of civil liabilities-administrative, common law, and statutorythat apply to protest activities. Part II examines the extent to which
civil costs and liabilities may chill or in some cases suppress First
Amendment protest rights. Part III analyzes specific costs of dissent in
light of the Supreme Court's precedents, which sharply limit the ex35 See Debra Cassens weiss, New Policy Authorizes University of Wisconsin to Expel Students for Repeatedly Disrupting Speakers, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 12, 2017, 3:58 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/newpolicyauthorizes_universityofwisconsintoexpel_stu
dents_forrepeate [https://perma.cc/LLP5-PG9X]; see also Schauer, supra note 12, at 1694 (discussing uncertainty relating to disruption); see generally Gregory P. Magarian, When Audiences
Object: Free Speech and Campus Speaker Protests, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 551 (2019) (examining
First Amendment implications of campus dissent).
36 See weiss, supra note 35.
37 See Anne Barnard, Teachers in New York City Barred From Attending Climate Protest,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/nyregion/youth-climate-strikenyc.html [https://perma.cc/3MSX-E3QQ] (discussing the decision of New York City Public
Schools to bar teachers from taking students on optional field trip to climate protests).
38

See generally AIMEE EDMONDSON, IN SULuVAN's SHADOw: THE USE AND ABUSE OF

LIBEL LAW DURING THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (2019); ANTHONY LEwIS, MAKE NO
LAW: THE SULIVAN CASE AND THE FmST AMENDMENT (1991).
39 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (revising state defamation
standards to require "actual malice" for statements concerning the official acts of public
officials).
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tent to which protesters are subject to civil liability. This Article argues that courts should explicitly reject a number of civil claims and

costs based on First Amendment precedents and doctrines. More generally, considering the First Amendment values at stake, this Article

urges public officials at all levels of government to work toward containing the rising costs of dissent. Once the dust of the current police
brutality protests settles, we will need both a good accounting of the
costs of dissent and a means of constitutionally apportioning those
costs in the future.
I.

THE COSTS

OF DISSENT

This Part provides an overview of the civil costs and liabilities
relating to protest activities. It starts with some administrative fees

and costs, then examines common law and statutory civil actions, and
finally civil penalty enhancements. Not all of these costs and liabilities
are of equal First Amendment concern. However, the cumulative

presentation is important, if only to put protesters on notice of their
potential exposure. As discussed in Part III, imposition of some of the
costs of dissent violates First Amendment precedents and doctrines.
Other costs and liabilities may survive First Amendment scrutiny but
are still problematic insofar as they inhibit protest activities.
A.

Administrative Costs

With respect to public protests, the costs of dissent begin to accrue at an early stage. Planned protest events such as sizeable rallies
and demonstrations are subject to permitting schemes.4 0 Pursuant to
those schemes, state and municipal laws require that protesters obtain
a permit, which often requires payment of a fee. 41
The costs only start there, and then can quickly add up. Some
municipalities charge fees for cleanup costs, security, and traffic control. 4 2 Some also require that applicants obtain liability insurance or
post bonds in advance of an event to cover costs and damages relating
to a protest event. 43 In the District of Columbia and other locations,
See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
41 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941); see generally David Goldberger, A
Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of
Using America's Public Forums?, 62 TEX. L. REv. 403, 404 (1983).
42 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010,
1015-17 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting total estimated charges for a planned march totaled $7,041).
43 See Neisser, supra note 11, at 300-29 (analyzing insurance requirements); see also Long
Beach Area Peace Network, 574 F.3d at 1037; Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa
Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006).
40

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

242

[Vol. 89:233

organizers must provide various amenities to demonstrators, including
toilets, medical tents, and cooling stations, provide setup and teardown crews, and take measures to protect the grass-all of which impose considerable costs.44
Local and federal officials have been exploring new ways to
recoup or recover costs relating to protest events. Some localities have
sought restitution for property and business damages caused by pro-

tests.45 The National Park Service, which oversees protest venues in
the District of Columbia, recently proposed regulations that would require protest organizers to repay the federal government for security
costs." Legislators have also floated proposals that would require
protesters arrested during unpermitted demonstrations to pay for po-

lice overtime 4 7 Legislatures in eighteen states are considering similar
proposals."
For large protest events, costs already run into tens of thousands
of dollars and more.49 Adding security and other costs in line with
recent proposals would raise the price tag for many significant public
protests considerably. 50
Common Law Tort Actions

B.

Fees and costs are just one of the potential liabilities protesters

face. They are also potentially subject to liability under a variety of
common law tort actions. These lawsuits can result in significant damages for physical, emotional, and economic harms, not to mention the
possible requirement for payment of legal fees and court costs.
Intentional Torts

1.

Plaintiffs have sued protesters for a variety of intentional torts.

For example, they have filed public nuisance and trespass claims
against organizers and participants involved in protests near abortion
clinics. 51 Plaintiffs have also sued abortion and environmental protes44 Lang, supra note 11.
45 See, e.g., That Free Speech Will Cost You $70,000, supra note 13 (reporting that Oakland
is seeking $70,000 in restitution to cover police and emergency services in relation to a chain-in
at a train station in November 2014).
46 Lang, supra note 11.
47 Id.

Ingraham, supra note 8.
49 See Lang, supra note 11 (noting that for large protests, organizers "can already expect to
stare down a budget of more than $100,000").
50 See id. (reviewing security budgets for recent D.C. protests, which ranged from tens of
thousands to millions of dollars).
51 See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1261-62
48
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ters for false imprisonment, interference with contractual and business
relations, inflicting emotional distress, private nuisance, and invasion
of privacy. 52
Business plaintiffs have also sued protesters for intentional torts.

Contractors and other businesses have successfully sued environmental protesters for compensatory and punitive damages in connection
with interference with prospective economic advantage and other

property torts. 53 In some instances, plaintiffs have also been awarded
significant punitive damages awards, in some cases in excess of $1
million.54

"Hostile audience" scenarios, in which audience members react
negatively to speech they disagree with or do not wish to encounter,
may also give rise to various forms of civil tort liability. 55 Thus, for
example, a speaker may sue audience members who push, block, or
shout her down for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and perhaps
other common law torts. 56
2.

Publicationof False Statements-"Aiding and
Abetting Defamation"

The law of defamation, which concerns false statements of fact
about an individual that damage reputation, applies to protest or-

ganizers and participants. False statements of fact about a public official or public figure generally require a showing that the speaker
communicated with "actual malice"-i.e., knowledge that the statements of fact were false or reckless disregard for their truth. 57 That

standard, based in First Amendment concerns, is a product of defamation claims filed during the civil rights era against media and other
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs had pleaded necessary elements of nuisance claim
against anti-abortion protesters).
52 See, e.g., Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir.
1991); Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 676-81 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (upholding liability of antiabortion protesters for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy in connection with focused picketing activities); Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon
Animal Cruelty, 896 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
53 See Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 986 P.2d 996, 1003, 1016 (Idaho 1999) (upholding
approximately $1 million damage award based on environmental protest activities including
spiking trees and obstructing roadways).
54 See, e.g., id. at 1003.
55 See generally Schauer, supra note 12, at 1693-94 (discussing various causes of action).
56 See

id

at 1693-94.

57 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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defendants determined to report on protests and other events central
to the civil rights movement. 58
The "actual malice" standard has curtailed the use of defamation
actions to suppress protest. However, the speech-protective standard
does not apply to false statements about a private individual or entity. 59 Private plaintiffs may still recover significant damage awards,
under a more forgiving standard (typically negligence), against protest
participants or supporters.
In one recent extraordinary case, a jury awarded a $44 million
verdict against Oberlin College ($11 million in compensatory damages
along with $33 million in punitive damages), a small private college
located in Ohio, for allegedly supporting statements by students that a
local bakery had engaged in racial profiling of customers. 60 Oberlin
students engaged in protest activities near the bakery and advocated a
boycott of the establishment. 61 An Oberlin official joined the students
at one protest outside the bakery, some faculty cancelled classes to
allow students to attend protests, and students used college resources
to print flyers condemning the establishment, resulting in the owners
suing the college for defamation. 62
This allegedly facilitative and supportive activity was the central
ground for imposing liability on the college. Under the theory of the
case, which we might call "aiding and abetting defamation," allies and
supporters of protesters could be liable for substantial damages for
encouraging a public protest or boycott action.
3.

"Negligent Protest"

Protest organizers also face substantial civil liability under certain
tort theories. Indeed, a recent lawsuit against a Black Lives Matter
(BLM) protest organizer may open the floodgates of tort liability.
58 See generally EDMONDSON, supra note 38.

.

59 See Gertz v. Robert welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (rejecting "actual malice"
standard in cases brought by private plaintiffs).
60 The trial judge later reduced the award to $25 million. Judge Reduces Jury Awards in
Dispute with Oberlin College, ASSOCIATED PRESs (June 28, 2019), https://apnews.com/f4bfb
5db0289435ba34f636f74566524 [https://perma.cc/95X3-V6PT]. The case is on appeal. See Appellants' Brief at 2, Gibson Bros., Inc. v. Oberlin College, Nos. 19CA011563 & 20CA011632 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 5, 2020)
61 See Dickson, supra note 27.
62 See Brian Pascus, Oberlin College President Carmen Twillie Ambar on the $44 Million
Ruling Against the School, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
[https://
oberlin-college-president-defamation-lawsuit-verdict-gibsons-bakery-44-million-libel/
perma.cc/VMW9-3VJN].
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In Doe v. Mckesson,63 a group of BLM activists blocked the highway in front of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana, police department headquarters to protest police misconduct (in this case, the killing of Alton
Sterling, an African American male).64 According to the complaint,
DeRay Mckesson, who is associated with Black Lives Matter, was
"the prime leader and an organizer of the protest." 65 Baton Rouge
police officers organized a line of officers in riot gear. 66 At some point,
an unidentified individual threw a hard object that injured an officer,
who later reported "loss of teeth, a jaw injury, a brain injury, a head
injury, lost wages, and 'other compensable losses.'"

67

Police arrested Mckesson and more than 100 others at the protest. The anonymous injured officer, referred to as John Doe, sued
Mckesson and the entire Black Lives Matter movement, alleging that
"Mckesson did nothing to prevent the violence or to calm the crowd"
and that he "incited the violence." 68 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that the officer could sue based on the theory that
"Mckesson breached his duty of reasonable care in the course of organizing and leading the Baton Rouge demonstration." 69 The court
reasoned that because blocking a highway is against the law, "Mckesson should have known that leading the demonstrators onto a busy
highway was likely to provoke a confrontation between police and the
mass of demonstrators, yet he ignored the foreseeable danger ... and
notwithstanding, did so anyway." 7 0 "By ignoring the foreseeable risk
of violence that his actions created," the court reasoned, "Mckesson

failed to exercise reasonable care in conducting his demonstration." 71
Even though an unidentified individual threw the object and
there was no evidence that Mckesson urged any participant or bystander to do so, the court held "Mckesson's negligent actions were
63

945 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2019).

64 Id. at 822; see also Phil McCausland, On Anniversary of Alton Sterling Killing, Protesters
Arrested, Pepper Sprayed, NBC NEWS (July 5, 2017, 11:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
nbcblk/anniversary-alton-sterling-killing-protesters-arrested-pepper-sprayed-n779911
[https://
perma.cc/7QG3-HXMS].
65 945 F.3d at 823.
66 Id. at 822.
67 Id. at 823.
68

Id.

Id. at 827. Judge willett dissented from the court's negligence holding, in part on the
ground that the First Amendment forecloses Doe's "negligent protest" theory of liability. Id. at
842-43 (willett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69

70 Id. at 827 (majority opinion).
71 Id.
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the [factual] causes of Officer Doe's injuries." 72 The majority concluded that so long as the officer alleged that his injuries were one of
the consequences of unlawful activity that Mckesson authorized or di-

rected, the First Amendment did not bar recovery. 73 The majority reasoned, "Mckesson directed the demonstrators to engage in the
criminal act of occupying the public highway, which quite consequentially provoked a confrontation between the Baton Rouge police and
the protesters, and that Officer Doe's injuries were the foreseeable

result of the tortious and illegal conduct of blocking a busy highway." 7 4 In short, the court held, because "Mckesson ordered the demonstrators to violate a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction
by blocking the public highway," a jury could find him liable for any
foreseeable civil or criminal act, by anyone, that transpired during the
protest. 75
Mckesson was decided before the mass protests for racial justice
following the deaths of George Floyd and other African Americans at
the hands of police and vigilantes. However, based on the "negligent
protest" theory, organizers of these or similar events could be liable

for any foreseeable damage that occurs at the public protestswhether or not the organizer participated in, encouraged, or directed
the harmful conduct.
"Tortious Petitioning"and Lost Business Opportunities

4.

"Negligent protest" is not the only novel tort theory plaintiffs

have recently pursued against protesters. Plaintiffs have also sought to
impose civil liability for lost economic opportunities allegedly resulting from the petitioning of government officials.
In City of Keene v. Cleaveland,76 the City brought an action for

tortious interference with contract relations against protesters who
followed parking enforcement officers and recorded their activities,

filled expired meters before the officers could issue parking citations,
and encouraged officers to leave their positions. 77 The meter-fillers
testified that they were protesting the City's enforcement actions
against drivers and petitioning government officials. 78
72 Id. at 828.
73 Id. at 829.
74

Id.

75
76
77
78

Id. at 832.
118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 255-56.
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The City sued the protesters, arguing that their actions interfered
with the contractual relations between the City and parking enforce-

ment officials. In that case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
expressed doubt as to whether the First Amendment permitted government to punish petitioning under common law tort theories. It ulti-

mately held that under the circumstances, imposing civil liability
would violate the protesters' First Amendment rights. 79 However, the
court left open the possibility that a content-neutral injunction might
still be enforceable against the protesters, presumably focused on
preventing them from physically harassing or interfering with parking
officials on the job.8 0
A more recent case resulted in a sizeable judgment based on a

similar theory. A jury imposed a $4 million judgment for interference
with contractual relations after a woman-the sister of former U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno-sent emails and other communications to local officials in which she harshly criticized, on environmental grounds, a proposed stormwater management project. 81 A state
appeals court upheld the verdict, obtained by a mining company that
stands to profit from the project.82 The court concluded that because
the defendant had acted with "actual malice" in making statements to
the commissioners, she was not entitled to any First Amendment or
state common law privilege relating to petitioning public officials. 83

This appears to be the first reported decision recognizing "tortious petitioning" as a cause of action. Under this theory, citizen interactions with public officials that result in injuries to third party
businesses may result in multimillion-dollar civil judgments.
Statutory Causes of Action

C.

Protest organizers, participants, and their supporters may also be
civilly liable under a variety of statutory causes of action. Federal and

state laws provide for liability for engaging in conspiracies, aiding
protesters, communicating threats, and racketeering activities.
1.

"Riot Boosting"

Following high-profile protests at Standing Rock, in Ferguson,
Missouri, and at President Trump's inauguration, several states en79 Id. at 261.
80
81
82
83

Id. at 264.
See Mazzei, supra note 33.
Hurchalla v. Lake Point Phase I, LLC, 278 So. 3d 58, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 65.
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acted civil provisions relating to protest activities. One of these provisions created a civil cause of action for "riot boosting," which occurs
when someone "directs, advises, encourages, or solicits" others to participate in public protests that turn out to be violent. 84
Under South Dakota's version of this cause of action, a person or
organization is liable for "riot boosting" if they engage in it personally
"or through any employee, agent, or subsidiary."8 5 The state or a third
party can sue the "riot booster" for extensive civil damages, including
punitive awards. 86 If the state sues, it must deposit any damages recovered in a "riot boosting recovery fund," which may be used to cover
its cleanup and other costs.87 In those actions, "riot boosting" recoveries act as another cost-shifting mechanism.
Similar to the "negligent protest" action, "riot boosting" may result in vicarious and collective liability for actions the defendant did
not expressly encourage, order or authorize. Under this cause of action, individuals, organizations, and protest funders may be civilly liable for substantial damages even if they did not personally participate
in any unlawful or violent protest.
2.

"Conspiracy to Protest"

An 1871 federal law, the Ku Klux Klan Act, imposes civil damages for engaging in private conspiracies to violate the civil rights of
racial and other minorities.88 The law, which originally targeted terrorist activities of the Klan during Reconstruction, requires a showing of
racial or other class-based animus and proof that the conspirators intended to deprive plaintiffs of rights guaranteed against private impairment (i.e., the right to be free from involuntary servitude and the
right to travel).89 During the 1980s and 1990s, abortion rights proponents unsuccessfully invoked this provision against anti-abortion
protesters, claiming that acts like blocking access to clinics constituted
a conspiracy to violate the civil rights of women. Many of those claims
failed owing to the lack of evidence of the necessary gender-based
animus.90
84

S.B. 189, 2019 Leg., 94th Sess. (S.D. 2019); see also Malone & Eidelman, supra note 24.

85

S.B. 189, 2019 Leg., 94th Sess. (S.D. 2019).
Id.

86

87 Id.
88 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

89 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Loc. 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
829, 833, 836 (1983).
90 See, e.g., Town of w. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039, 1046 (2d Cir. 1993)
(rejecting claim under the Klan Act); Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624,
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By contrast, in Sines v. Kessler,91 a district court recently ruled
that a group of plaintiffs could invoke the Klan Act to seek damages
against the organizers of demonstrations held in Charlottesville during
the summer of 2017.92 In Sines, residents of Charlottesville, Virginia
who suffered injuries at the now-infamous "Unite the Right" rally and
an earlier demonstration brought an action against several organizations and individual members who organized and participated in the
rallies. 93 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the 1871 Act and
related state laws by conspiring to engage in violence against racial
minorities and their supporters. 94 The district court concluded that the
complaint was legally and factually sufficient to overcome dismissal as
to all but one plaintiff.95 It also concluded that the plaintiffs alleged
sufficient facts to demonstrate that the defendants conspired to engage in racial violence and the defendants' overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy caused the plaintiffs' injuries. 96
The district court's decision did not hold that the defendants were

liable, but rather only that the facts alleged in the complaint were generally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.7 Because its analysis
centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, the court's opinion is factintensive. 98 As the court noted, the plaintiffs' complaint itself is 112-

pages long.9 9 As the district court observed, "the complaint frequently
uses vague nouns, lumping all Defendants and all co-conspirators to-

gether."100 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the court
should treat any rally attendee who merely disagreed with plaintiffs'
views as part of an unlawful conspiracy.1 01 The court emphasized that

its opinion relied largely on summaries of allegations against various
628 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff abortion provider had not shown evidence of genderbased animus); Miss. women's Med. Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 1989)
(same).
91 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (W.D. Va. 2018).
92 Id. at 797-98. The case was originally scheduled to be tried in October 2020, but it has
been delayed. See Tyler Hammel, Unite the Right Lawsuit Trial Delayed Amid COVID-19 Concerns, DAILY PROGRESs (Sept. 7, 2020), https://dailyprogress.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
unite-the-right-lawsuit-trial-delayed-amid-covid-19-concerns/article_3a8b98c3-dcb-5517-80b19488019f7580.html [https://perma.cc/7XY5-68AC].
93 324 F. Supp. 3d at 774-75.
94 Id. at 773.
95 See id. at 798.
96 Id. at 795-98.
97 Id. at 773.
98 See id at 773-74.
99 Id. at 774.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 784.
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defendants, and that it was not certain the plaintiffs would or could
prove these allegations at trial.102 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a conspiracy to violate plaintiffs'
civil rights.103
Notwithstanding its preliminary posture, Sines is a potentially sig-

nificant case concerning protester liability. The requirement of racial
animus narrows the scope of the Klan Act, and the case may turn on
whether the district court was correct in holding that the plaintiffs are

among its intended beneficiaries. 104 However, as explained further in
Part III, the district court's theory of liability relies substantially on

various allegations relating to actions taken to organize or publicize
the protests. That approach suggests that plaintiffs could successfully

pursue "conspiracy to protest" cases against organizers of Black Lives
Matter, gun rights, and other protests.
Threats and Racketeering

3.

Political protesters may also be civilly liable under federal and
state statutes prohibiting certain communications and activities. In
particular, protesters may incur civil liability for threatening commu-

nications and for engaging in concerted racketeering activities.
In PlannedParenthoodof the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Ameri-

can Coalition of Life Activists, the full Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld a substantial judgment against anti-abortion protesters
under the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
("FACE"). 105 As its name suggests, FACE protects the rights of women and health care workers to access clinics for the purpose of obtaining and providing abortion services. 106 The law also imposes a civil
107
fine for communicating threats against abortion providers.
In American Coalition of Life Activists, an organization of pro-

life activists distributed "Wanted" posters that identified certain abor108
tion providers and accused them of "crimes against humanity." The
group also maintained a "Nuremberg Files" website that, among other
things, kept track of abortion providers who had been murdered or
102

Id. at 784-95.

103 Id.
104 See id. at 780-82 (concluding that racial animus requirement extends to animus against
African Americans' supporters and plaintiffs pled a cognizable "right to be free from racial
violence").
105 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
106 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).
107 Id. § 248(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)(A).
108 Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1062-63.
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injured.1 09 The court upheld a multimillion dollar civil verdict based
on the flyers and website.11O It held that their content was not political
speech made in the context of a public debate about abortion but
rather communications that a reasonable recipient would perceive as a
threat of bodily injury or death.'11

FACE contains a specific threats provision, applicable in the context of abortion clinics.11 2 However, the Ninth Circuit's logic applies to
any law that prohibits threatening communications. Protesters who
communicate ideas or messages that courts or juries could conclude

are serious expressions of an intent to harm another may be liable for
significant civil damages.113

Protest organizers may also incur liability under federal and state
civil racketeering laws. In the past, pro-choice activists and abortion

providers invoked these laws to prevent anti-abortion protesters from
blocking access and engaging in other violent activities near clinics.
Thus, under the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),114 abortion clinics and their supporters alleged
a coordinated campaign by protest "enterprises" to deprive women of
access to clinics and drive the clinics out of business.1"5
In one of these cases, the Supreme Court rejected an argument

that RICO only applied where the alleged wrongdoers' pattern of interstate racketeering activity had an economic motive, opening the
way for application of RICO to a variety of political and other ideological protests.11 6 In response to complaints that this interpretation
unduly expanded RICO's language, the Court subsequently interpreted the statute in a manner that makes it more difficult to apply to
abortion clinics and perhaps other protests.11 7 However, given the
Id. at 1062.
110 Id. at 1088.
109

11

Id.

112 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).
113 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.").
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
115 See, e.g., Palmetto State Med. Ctr. v. Operation Lifeline, 117 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir.
1997) (upholding dismissal of RICO claims against abortion protesters); Ne. Women's Ctr. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing RICO claim to proceed against
anti-abortion protesters).
116 See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994) (holding RICO
contains no economic motive requirement).
117 See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2003) (concluding
that abortion protesters did not "obtain" property by their acts, and thus did not commit extortion in violation of RICO).
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flexibility of its terms, including the definition of "enterprise" and the
wide variety of predicate acts that support a RICO claim, the federal
law may apply to environmental, animal rights, and other protesters.118 Further, at the state level, legislatures can propose laws that
19
hold counterprotesters liable under racketeering provisions.1

D.

Penalty Enhancements

Federal and state laws also provide for enhanced civil penalties
for protest-related activities. RICO, discussed earlier, provides for
treble civil damages.1 20 Civil rights laws, FACE,121 and state laws provide for enhanced fines, civil penalties, and punitive damages.
As noted earlier, in response to recent public protests, many state
legislatures have considered or adopted measures increasing the civil
liability of protesters. The enactments include enhanced civil penalties.1 22 More specifically, as they relate to public protest activities,
these laws:
" Significantly increase the civil fines imposed for obstructing traffic or trespassing;
" Allow businesses to sue individuals who target them with
protests;
" Increase fines for "mass picketing" behavior;
" Create new civil penalties for protests that take place
near "critical infrastructure" ranging from gas pipelines
to telephone poles; and
" Apply state anti-racketeering laws, including asset forfeiture provisions, to protest groups.1 23
Owing to their focus on repetitive behaviors or patterns of conduct, some of these penalty enhancements may disparately affect activists.12 4 For instance, pro-life abortion protesters and environmental
118 See, e.g., Jaime I. Roth, Reptiles in the Weeds: Civil RICO vs. The FirstAmendment in
the Animal Rights Debate, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467,468 (2002); Alexander M. Parker, Stretching
RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819, 847-48 (1996); Suzanne wentzel, National
Organization for women v. Scheidler: RICO a Valuable Tool for Controlling Violent Protest, 28
AKRON L. REv. 391, 392 (1995); Carole Golinski, Recent Decision, In Protest of NOW v.
Scheidler, 46 ALA. L. REv. 163, 163-64 (1994); Lynn D. wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free
Speech: A Lesson From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REv. 853, 900 (1999); Tracy S. Craige,
Abortion Protest: Lawless Conspiracy or Protected Free Speech?, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 445, 450
(1995).
119 See Ingraham, supra note 8; Yoder, supra note 9.

120
121
122
123
124

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id. § 248.
U.S. Protest Law Tracker, supra note 9 (tracking and describing the laws and bills).
See Ingraham, supra note 8; Yoder, supra note 9.
See generally Jacobs, supra note 17 (analyzing various penalty enhancements).
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activists who trespass on private properties may face enhanced penalties under FACE, RICO, and newly enacted state laws relating to
"critical infrastructure."125 Enhanced penalties apply where individuals engage in civil disobedience, such as trespass and interference with
business operations.
E.

Public Education and Government Employment
Finally, some of the potential costs of engaging in protest are not

monetary, in the narrow sense of consisting of fines and damage
awards. Protesters must also consider the possibility that owing to
their activities they may suffer loss of educational or employment
opportunities.
The focus here is on public school students and public employees
for the simple reason that the First Amendment applies only in those
realms and, as discussed later, may offer affected parties some relief.
Private school students and private employees may face similar consequences for their protest activities. They may be able to assert remedies under federal or state laws. For example, private-sector
employees have the right to engage in concerted activity and discuss
the terms and conditions of employment under the federal National
Labor Relations Act.1 26 In some states, private-sector employers can-

not discriminate against their employees based on their political
activity.127
In the context of public education, students may suffer adverse
consequences if they organize or participate in protest activity. Officials may even be able to discipline students for engaging in off-hours

protest activity, should that activity have a disruptive effect on school
functions.1 28 In addition, state legislators and public university officials
have been increasingly concerned about protests on campus.1 29 In re125 See Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101, 106-11 (Or. 1993) (in banc)
(rejecting the argument that the punitive damages award violated the State Constitutional Free
Speech Guarantee or First Amendment).
126 29 U.S.C. §H 157, 158(c).
127 See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012).
128 The issue has arisen in a number of cases involving off-campus student social media
expression. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d
Cir. 2011) (holding school officials could not punish students for creating fake online profiles of
school officials absent reasonable forecast that expression would cause substantial disruption on
campus); Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding public
high school could expel student for sending instant messages to his classmates that could be
interpreted as planning violent attack).
129 See generally Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, U.S. NEWS
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sponse to incidents in which students have interrupted or interfered
with scheduled speakers and events, they have proposed new penalties for students who engage in disruptive protest. A Wisconsin bill
would have required disciplinary action be taken against community

members who engage in "violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, obscene, unreasonably loud, or other disorderly conduct that interferes with the free expression of others." 130 Although that bill did

not pass, the University of Wisconsin ultimately adopted a policy allowing officials to discipline students who "materially and substantially" disrupt the free speech of others.131 Arizona, North Carolina,

Florida, and Georgia have enacted similar policies. 132 Under this approach, students who interfere with campus events are subject to discipline, up to and including expulsion.
Public sector employees have First Amendment rights to engage
in political speech and political protest. However, those rights are constrained by employer interests in morale and efficient operations. The
Supreme Court has held that when a public employee speaks as a citi-

zen on a matter of public concern, the First Amendment bars adverse
employment action so long as the right to speak outweighs the employer's interests.1 33 That balancing standard may offer little protec-

tion to an employee who engages in protest activity when his superiors
disapprove of it. Suppose, for example, a public school teacher decides
to attend a climate change protest with her students in direct violation
of a school board order.1 34 Whether the teacher attended in order to

provide students without parental supervision an opportunity to par3

(July 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-07- 1/campusfree-speech-laws-ignite-the-country (last visited Jan. 17, 2021); see also INT'L CTR. FOR NONPROFIT L., CAMPUs SPEECH BILLS AND THE RIoHT TO PROTEST 1 (2018), https://
mkOrofifiqa2w3u89nud.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/ICNL-Campus-Speech-Briefer65 837 9 8 4 3 5 8 5886 68 78
[https://
1
- 4 1 1 .1
April-2018.pdf?_ga=2.253821832.1025486685.15888
perma.cc/PBG4-BwAw].
130 Cara Lombardo, Groups, Students at Odds Over University Free Speech Bill, AssociATED PREss (May 11, 2017) (internal quotations omitted), https:/apnews.com/article/bdd14975
b6a34d06a97a1f300c40af91 [https://perma.cc/92NQ-64GT].
131 "Campus Free Speech Acts" Die in Wisconsin, NAT'L CTR. FOR Sci. EDUC. (Mar. 29,
2018), https://ncse.ngo/campus-free-speech-acts-die-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/7LH3-6WKw];
Yvonne Kim, UW Regents Approve Mandatory Student Punishments for DisruptingFree Speech,
CAP TIMEs (Oct. 11, 2019), https://madison.com/ct/news/local/education/university/uw-regentsapprove-mandatory-student-punishments-for-disrupting-free-speech/article_6852flc1-ce5c-5cecbee5-2d3a5260cf70.html [https://perma.cc/7SL2-WL84].
132 See H.B. 2563, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018); Campus Free Expression Act, FLA.
STAT. § 1004.097 (2018); S.B. 339, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018).
133 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
134 See Barnard, supra note 37.
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ticipate or simply out of solidarity with their students, she may lose
her job. Moreover, public employers have terminated public employ-

ees for posting controversial political and social viewpoints on social
media. 1 3 5 Similarly, public employees could be terminated simply for
attending a public protest at which others communicate offensive or
incendiary ideas. In general, if public protest activity reflects negatively on the employer or creates disruption within the office, the First
Amendment does not protect the employee's protest activity.1 36

II.

THE CHILLING EFFECTS OF CIVIL COSTS AND

LIABILrTIES

The various administrative costs, civil actions, and penalties described in Part I seriously affect First Amendment speech, assembly,

and petition rights. Civil costs and liabilities threaten the exercise of
First Amendment rights in two distinct, but related, ways. The first
concern is that imposition of costs and liabilities will effectively pro-

hibit expressive activities. The second concern relates to indeterminate liability standards, which can also chill protest and other First
Amendment activities. In both respects, civil costs and liabilities implicate the rights and values associated with the First Amendment.
A.

Financial Burdens

Civil costs and liabilities impose significant monetary burdens on
public protest organizers and participants. These costs, which include
monetary judgments, lawyers' fees, security costs, liability insurance
requirements, and, in some cases, enhanced civil damages, can be

staggering. For protesters of limited means, the costs and liabilities
can effectively prevent participation in protest activities. These civil
costs are, of course, in addition to restitution and other costs associated with criminal penalties.1 37 Even for those who have some ability

to pay, the prospect of significant administrative costs, massive damage awards, civil penalties, loss of employment, and other costs might
135 See David L. Hudson Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn't
Always Protect Government Workers, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.
com/magazine/article/public-employees-privatespeech [https://perma.cc/C38H-YD9D]
(discussing cases involving public employee social media speech).
136 See, e.g., Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 179-83 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding termination of police officers who appeared in public on racially derogatory parade float).
137 See Anna Stolley Persky, Protesters May Pay the Price When Civil Disobedience Becomes Costly, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 2:50 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
protestersmaypay-the-price-when-civildisobediencebecomes
costly [https://perma.cc/
JJQ7-NXF4] (discussing monetary and other costs associated with criminal arrest and
conviction).
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understandably diminish willingness to organize, participate in, or
support public protests and other forms of dissent.1 38
Although Part I presents a general overview of the various monetary and other liabilities that apply to protest activity, even this account does not tell the complete story. The costs of dissent are part of
a protest infrastructure that imposes significant monetary and nonmonetary burdens on protest activities. These non-monetary burdens
include, among other things, strict limits on access to public places,
aggressive methods of protest policing, bureaucratic requirements applicable to public protests, and negative public and official attitudes
toward protest and dissent. 139 The civil costs described in Part I are
thus an additional layer of burdens and obstacles imposed on protest
organizers, participants, and supporters. When thinking about the potential chilling effects of fees, damages, and the like, we need to appreciate that they are part of a multilayered regulatory framework
that applies to protest activity.
History bears out the concern that civil costs can significantly

chill protest. During the civil rights movement, opponents of racial
equality turned to civil actions, including defamation lawsuits against
newspapers and journalists, as a means of chilling and suppressing
press reporting on segregation and civil rights.14 0 These were early and
effective SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) actions-lawsuits filed to intimidate defendants from speaking out or
publishing critical information.'14 Defamation lawsuits ultimately silenced thousands of journalists and others seeking to report on the
civil rights movement. 4 2 Tort liability was just one of many weapons

opponents of racial equality used to inhibit expression. They also re138 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) ("Excessive fines can be used ...
chill the speech of political enemies .... ").

[to]

139 See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORs: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT

LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2008) (examining spatial and other restrictions on public protest);
Inazu, supra note 3 (examining use of unlawful assembly arrests to restrict public protests); Edward R. Maguire, New Directions in Protest Policing, 35 ST. LoUIs U. PUB. L. REV. 67 (2015)
(describing aggressive protest policing tactics); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110
MICH. L. REV. 761 (2012) (noting the influence policing discretion has on public protests); Felicia Sonmez, Trump Suggests That ProtestingShould Be Illegal, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:35
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-suggests-protesting-should-be-ilegal/2018/
09/04/llcfd9be-bOa0-11e8-aed9-001309990777_story.html [https://perma.cc/35EP-YA58] (quoting President Trump as saying, "I think it's embarrassing for the country to allow protesters.").
140 For a thorough account of the use of defamation claims to suppress reporting on and
discussion about racial justice, see EDMONDSON, supra note 38.
141 See Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection:Unburdening the Right of Petition in
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969-73 (1999) (explaining concept of SLAPP lawsuits).
142 See EDMONDSON, supra note 38, at 9.
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lied on law enforcement actions, enforcement of business registration
laws, and other measures (including vigilante violence) to suppress
civil rights activism.1 43 However, defamation actions were a central

part of the strategy for suppressing political speech.
The Supreme Court eventually intervened and recognized the
chilling effect of tort lawsuits on press and speech. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,144 the Court articulated the "central meaning of the
First Amendment"-that freedom of speech and press required protection for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on matters of
public concern. 145 To preserve that central First Amendment value, it
held that states were required to alter their defamation laws in actions
brought by public officials. 146 The Court ruled that public officials
could sue for false statements about their official duties only when
they could demonstrate that publishers communicated false statements with "actual malice"-knowledge that they were false or reck-

less disregard for falsity.1 47
This significant restructuring of state defamation laws was a direct

response to concerns about the chilling effect of defamation judgments. As the Court observed, "The fear of damage awards under a
rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be mark-

edly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute." 148 As the Court emphasized, "since there is no double-jeop-

ardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same
publication."1 49 Even if The New York Times could survive multiple

judgments of many thousands of dollars, the Court recognized that
most media outlets could not. Civil damage awards could effectively
put many newspapers and other outlets out of business.
The Court expressed similar concerns about the chilling effects of
tort liability in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 5 0 a case ex-

amined in greater detail in Section III.B. In that case, a Mississippi
state court judge found that the NAACP and individual defendants
143 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958) (rejecting
state's argument that it needed list of rank-and-file members of NAACP in order to determine
whether the organization was lawfully doing business in Alabama).
144 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145 Id. at 270, 273.
146 Id. at 279-80.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 277.
149 Id. at 278.
150 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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who organized or participated in a boycott of white businesses during
the civil rights movement were jointly and severally liable for all of
the economic damages stemming from the boycott, which lasted from
1966 to 1972-a total of $1,250,699, plus interest.151 The Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed the finding of liability and agreed with the
lower court that the defendants were liable for any damages relating

to the boycott, but it reversed and remanded the case with instructions
to clarify the basis for liability of several of the defendants.1 52
On appeal, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the liability
of the defendants who organized and participated in the boycott.1 53
Recognizing that protests, including business boycotts, are a critically
important means of political and social change, the Court sharply lim-

ited the civil liability of protest organizers for the unlawful acts of
some protest participants. 154 It warned that without strict limitations,
civil damage awards could chill or even suppress First Amendment
speech and association rights.1 55

In ClaiborneHardware, the Supreme Court was worried not only
about the costs imposed on individual protesters, but also about the
effect massive damages awards would have on the formation of associations and social movements. It quoted with approval Justice

Douglas, who had written in a prior decision, "The rights of political
association are fragile enough without adding the additional threat of
destruction by lawsuit."1

B.

56

Indeterminate Liability Standards
A second concern with respect to civil costs and liabilities relates

not to the monetary burdens but to the indeterminacy of liability stan-

dards applicable to protesters. Adoption and application of ambiguous, overbroad,

and indeterminate

civil liability standards

can

significantly chill expressive activity. This is a general First Amend151 Id. at 891-93.
152 Id. at 894.
153 Id. at 920.
154 Id. at 926-27.
155 Id. at 915-16.
156 Id. at 931-32 (quoting NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)). The Court has limited tort liability on First Amendment
grounds in other contexts not directly implicating protest rights but raising similar concerns
about chilling speech on matters of public concern. Thus, for example, it has applied Sullivan's
"actual malice" standard in suits invoking the "false light" invasion of privacy tort. See Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (invalidating civil
judgment against newspaper for printing name of rape victim).
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ment concern, applicable to all sorts of laws.1 57 However, the Supreme

Court has specifically addressed the potential chilling effect of civil
liability standards.
The entire law of defamation reflects First Amendment concerns.
Over time, the Court has constitutionalized and made more precise all
elements of the defamation tort, including standards of proof and the
requirement of falsity.1 58 It did this "against the background of a

profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."159
In Snyder v. Phelps,160 members of the Westboro Baptist Church
protested outside the funeral of Matthew Snyder, a U.S. soldier killed
in Iraq. Church members, who had secured permission to demonstrate
in a space adjacent to a public street some 1,000 feet from the funeral,

displayed their signs-stating, e.g., "Thank God for Dead Soldiers,"
"Fags Doom Nations," "America is Doomed," "Priests Rape Boys,"
and "You're Going to Hell"-for about 30 minutes before the funeral

began. 161 Matthew Snyder's father, Alfred, saw the tops of the picketers' signs when driving to the funeral but did not learn what they said
until watching a news broadcast later that night.1 62 Alfred Snyder sued
the Westboro protesters for, among other things, intentional infliction

of emotional distress. 163 A jury held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in
compensatory damages and $8 million (later reduced by the trial court

to $2.1 million) in punitive damages.16
The Supreme Court held that the imposition of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress violated the First Amendment.165 It reasoned that Westboro's speech, including its signs,

concerned "matters of public concern"-e.g., "the political and moral
conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation,
homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic
clergy . . . ."166 The Court observed, "Given that Westboro's speech
157 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) ("The Constitution
gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's
vast and privileged sphere.").
158 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (announcing "actual malice" standard); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (falsity requirement).
159 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
160 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
161 Id. at 448, 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. at 449.
163 Id. at 450.
164

Id.

165 Id. at 459.
166 Id. at 453-54.
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was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is
167
entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment."
The Court also relied on the ambiguity of the liability standard. It
concluded that the First Amendment barred imposing liability under
the intentional infliction's "outrageousness" standard because such a
subjective standard would allow juries to enter judgments against unpopular, provocative, or offensive speakers based on the content of
their expression.168 In Snyder, the Court again altered common law
tort liability owing to concerns that an indeterminate standard would
69
chill speech and suppress discussion of public issues.1
In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
public protest and dissent may be deterred "not only [by] heavyby more subtle governmental inhanded frontal attack, but also ...
70 It has stressed both the chilling effect of civil damages
terference."1
and the inhibiting power of indeterminate civil liability standards.
Based on these concerns, and to preserve robust discussion of public
issues by individuals and organizations, the Court has narrowed damages liability in some contexts and eliminated it altogether in others.
Part III examines more specifically how the Court's precedents and
First Amendment values should affect how courts and other officials
assess a variety of civil costs and liabilities.
III.

THE

FIRST

AMENDMENT

AND PROTEST LIABILITY

Concerns about chilling First Amendment rights and doing harm
to its central values ought to inform how courts and other officials
approach the various and rising costs of dissent. However, officials
need more concrete guidance. The Supreme Court has not provided
much. This Part first identifies the rules, standards, and values the Supreme Court has articulated in the civil liability context. It next analyzes various costs and liabilities in accordance with this guidance.
A.

General FirstAmendment Limits
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that civil costs can chill

expressive activities, the manner and extent to which the First

Amendment limits those liabilities is not entirely clear. Indeed, in
many respects the boundaries remain uncertain. In order to assess
traditional costs and novel claims (e.g., "negligent protest" and "riot
167 Id. at 458.
168 See id. at 458-59 (discussing "outrageousness" standard).
169

Id.

170 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
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boosting"), we need first to have an understanding of the current
standards.
1.

Fees and Costs

In terms of permit fees and other costs, the Supreme Court upheld a maximum fee of $300 in a case decided in 1941.171 It has not
subsequently clarified how much officials may charge or whether they
are required to waive fees and costs for some protesters. The Court
has never addressed whether localities can insist on liability insurance,
condition protest rights on other liability considerations, or recoup
protest-related costs from organizers or participants. 172
The Supreme Court has held that officials cannot vary the
amount of the permit fee, for instance according to their own predictions about how violent crowds will become. 173 Variable fees violate
the First Amendment because they empower government to discrimi-

nate against unpopular speakers. Beyond this, the Court has not ventured any guidance with respect to the administrative costs of protest.

2.

Protesters'Misconduct
As far as substantive liability limits, the Court has held that the

First Amendment does not limit the imposition of civil damages, penalties, or other costs associated with a protest organizer's or partici-

pant's own violent or unlawful conduct. As the Court stated in
Claiborne Hardware, "[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence." 174 Thus, a protester who physically assaults someone or throws
a rock or other object at a law enforcement officer or counterprotester

is clearly liable for damages from such unlawful acts.
Similarly, the First Amendment does not protect individuals who
intentionally conspire to engage in unlawful acts, including but not
limited to violent conduct. 175 Thus, where there is clear proof of an
intent to further the unlawful aims of a group, conspiracy and other
civil claims do not violate the First Amendment. However, courts and

juries cannot infer the requisite intent from membership in the group
or other protected First Amendment activities. Rather, government

must prove intent to engage in violent or unlawful activities.1 76
171 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941) (upholding a permit fee of $300,
although no fee was actually charged).
172 See generally Neisser, supra note 11, at 260.
173 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992).
174 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
175 See id. at 920.
176 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ("[Q]uasi-political parties or other
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General Limits on Civil Actions

Some commentators have argued that courts should not interpret
the First Amendment in a manner that limits the imposition of certain
tort liabilities. 177 However, as applied to protest activities, the First

Amendment limits civil liability, at least to some degree. The Supreme
Court has made clear that the First Amendment applies to private
civil actions, including those addressed in this Article, even though
they typically involve two private parties. 178 Whatever concerns some
179
as it relates to
might have about First Amendment "expansionism,"
civil liability, protest-related costs and liabilities raise significant First

Amendment concerns.
Where peaceful forms of protest, dissent, and expression form
even part of the basis for civil liability, courts are duty-bound to con180
sider whether those actions comport with the First Amendment. As
the Court stated in Claiborne Hardware, the First Amendment "im-

poses a special obligation" on courts to "examine critically the basis on
which liability was imposed." 181 In such circumstances, the Court has
1
emphasized, "[p]recision of regulation" is required. 82

Together, the highlighted phrases-"special obligation," "examine critically," and "precision of regulation,"-establish that the
First Amendment significantly limits protesters' potential civil liability
groups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is
defined by its criminal purpose .... "); see also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908 ("The right
to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the
group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected.").
177 See Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, First Amendment Imperialism and the
Constitutionalizationof Tort Liability, 98 TEX. L. REV. 813, 844 (2020) (arguing that First
Amendment concerns should not limit application of certain torts, including fraud, product disparagement, and intentional interference with business relations).
178 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (concluding that First Amendment applied to states' enforcement of common law defamation standards); see also Daniel J.
Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1650, 1689 (2009) (proposing "duty-defining power" theory of First Amendment limits on civil
liability, which focuses on governmental use of power to influence expression).
179 Regarding concerns about expansive interpretations of the scope of the First Amendment see, e.g., Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The
Ascendant LibertarianSpeech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2017); Amanda Shanor,
The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016); Leslie Kendrick, FirstAmendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2015).
180 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916-17 ("[T]he presence of activity protected by
the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages liability
and on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages.").
181 Id. at 915 (emphasis added).
182 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (emphasis added) ("Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
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exposure. Indeed, these principles or guidelines are particularly important where political expression and speech on matters of public
concern are involved. 183
Applying these general guidelines, the Supreme Court has altered
some common law standards and required that they be precise, prohibited certain civil actions altogether, and interpreted protest-related
civil statutes narrowly. As discussed earlier, concerning allegedly defamatory statements pertaining to public officials' exercise of their official duties, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requires that states

apply an "actual malice" standard.1 84 The Court later extended this
speech-protective rule to "public figures," or those who have general
fame or notoriety in a community (i.e., celebrities and sports
figures).1 85 Private individuals can generally recover based on a show-

ing of negligence, although punitive damage rewards require that the
higher standard be satisfied. 186
Snyder v. Phelps, of course, went further and eliminated protesters' liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.187 Snyder
precludes liability so long as the protest relates to "matters of public
concern." 188 In other words, the Court prohibited the imposition of
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on communications on matters of public concern.1 89 Acknowledging that the
Westboro speech was particularly upsetting to Matthew Snyder's
grieving father, the Court nevertheless held that the tort's "outrageousness" standard lacked the requisite precision.'9 The standard essentially licensed or encouraged juries to engage in content
discrimination. 191
The Court has also interpreted federal statutes in ways that recognize their effects on speech, association, and petition rights. It has
interpreted the Sherman Act, which relates to restraints on trade, in a
183 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913 (observing that political expression "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government.").
184 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
185 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
186 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
187 562 U.S. 443, 458-59 (2011).
188 Id. at 451.
189 Id. at 458.
190 Id.
191 See id. (holding that the jury must consider "[w]hat [the defendant] said, in the whole
context of how and where it chose to say it" to determine First Amendment protection).
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manner intended to preserve collective expression and certain forms
of political activism.1 92 Similarly, the Court has interpreted federal labor laws as limiting damages for secondary boycotts and other activities owing to the threat damage awards pose to protected forms of
collective expression. 19 3 As discussed earlier, the Court has interpreted the civil RICO provisions in ways that limit the potential exposure of protesters. 194

4.

Vicarious and Collective Liability

A substantial question at the intersection of the protest activity
and civil liability pertains to protesters' liability for the violent and
unlawful acts of others. ClaiborneHardware, which addressed this aspect of liability in the context of a civil rights boycott, represents the
Court's most significant engagement with this issue.
In Claiborne Hardware, protesters demanded that local officials
and businesses change a variety of practices that harmed African
Americans living in the community. 195 When these changes did not
materialize, the protesters participated in an economic boycott of
white businesses.1 96 At the outset of its opinion, the Court observed
that the boycott of white merchants "included elements of criminality
and elements of majesty."197 During the seven-year period under review, a few protesters committed violent acts.1 98 The trial court concluded that the boycott was itself unlawful as a restraint of trade and
held all organizers and participants jointly and severally liable for the
damages suffered by white merchants.199 The Mississippi Supreme
Court upheld the finding of liability, although on the different ground
that boycott organizers had "agreed to use force, violence and
'threats' to effectuate the boycott." 200
The Supreme Court emphasized that banding together for the
lawful purpose of protesting segregation and other race-based harms
192 See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961)
(observing that Congress likely did not intend the antitrust laws to prohibit speech and petition
rights of industries).
193 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966) (emphasizing limits
on liability for peaceful picketing).
194 See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2003) (rejecting imposition of liability on pro-life protesters).
195 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889 (1982).
196 Id.

197 Id. at 888.
198

Id. at 894.

199 Id. at 892-93.
200

Id. at 895 (emphasis omitted).
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enhanced effective advocacy, and it effectively combined speech and
assembly rights into a formidable means of change.2 01 It concluded
that boycott organizers and participants were engaged in protected
association and "speech in its most direct form." 202 Accordingly, the
Court emphasized that the earlier-mentioned First Amendment
guidelines applied. 203
The Court acknowledged that a state law could impose damages
on any protester who engaged in violent conduct.2 04 Thus, states could
impose civil liability for damages "directly and proximately caused by
wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants. 2 05 According to the
Court, this "careful limitation on damages" was necessary owing to

the important First Amendment interests involved.2 06 Thus, it emphasized that "[o]nly those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct
may be recovered." 207 As examples of such unlawful conduct, the

Court mentioned "use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline." 208 In
sum, the Court concluded, "a judgment tailored to the consequences
of [protesters'] unlawful conduct may be sustained." 209
This raises the question: where a protest involves both nonviolent

protected activities and unlawful violence, what conduct is "chargeable to defendants"? The Court concluded that states retain undiminished

authority to impose damages

on protest

organizers

and

participants who themselves perpetrate violence; however, states may
hold a protest leader personally responsible for wrongs committed by
others only when the leader himself "authorized, directed, or ratified"
the violent acts.2 10 In recognition of the First Amendment right of as-

sociation, "[c]ivil liability may not be imposed," the Court wrote,
"merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of
which committed acts of violence." 211 The Court concluded, "For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to
establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the
individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims." 2 12
201

Id. at 907-08.

Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
202

212

Id.

at
at
at
at

909.
915.
916.
918 (emphasis added).

(emphasis added).
at 916.
at 926.
at 927.
at 920.
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As the Court observed, "[t]he right to associate does not lose all
constitutional protection merely because some members of the group
may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is
not protected." 213 Indeed, even if protesters form an association to advocate or undertake unlawful action, an individual is not liable for
assisting in lawful meetings and other protected protest activities unrelated to such purposes. 214 Civil liability is appropriate only when the
association has unlawful aims and the protest leader or participant intends to further them through unlawful acts. 2 1 5

The Court specifically rejected the idea that courts could impose
civil liability for regular attendance at weekly meetings of the NAACP
where illegal conduct had not been "authorized, ratified, or even discussed." 216 That, the Court said, would be tantamount to imposing lia-

bility based on a principle of "guilt for association," which would
clearly violate the First Amendment. 217 Nor, because they were lawful
activities, could courts impose civil liability for nonviolent actions intended to facilitate or enforce the boycott. 218 In Claiborne Hardware,

this included watching the stores to record who violated the boycott or
wearing apparel associated with the boycott as a reminder that participants were indeed watching. 219
The Court also addressed whether the award of damages against
Charles Evers, one of the boycott organizers and Field Secretary of
the NAACP, violated the First Amendment. Insofar as Evers attended
meetings and persuaded African Americans to boycott white

merchants, the Court held that the First Amendment fully protected
his activities. 220 Evers also delivered public speeches in which he said
that those who did not boycott would be "disciplined" and indicated,
"If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn neck." 221 The Court held that these speeches did not
constitute a proper basis for imposing liability on Evers for violent
acts committed much later by others. 222 It reasoned that his speeches
213 Id. at 908.
214 Id.
215 Id.

216 Id. at 924.
217 Id. at 925.
218 Id. at 915 (noting "the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities are entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment").
219 Id. at 925.
220 Id. at 926.
221 Id. at 902 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222 Id. at 926-27.
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"predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric" that did
not pass the bounds of First Amendment protection. 223

Reviewing with the requisite "precision," the Court concluded
that Evers' "strong language" did not amount to "fighting words" or
speech inciting unlawful action, but rather was "an impassioned plea
for black citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to
realize the political and economic power available to them." 2 2 4 The

Court did note, "If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could
be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct." 2 2 5 However, the only acts of violence had occurred weeks after Evers'

speeches. 226 In addition, there was no evidence aside from the
speeches that Evers "authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts
of violence." 227 Thus, the Court concluded, "The findings are constitutionally inadequate to support the damages judgment against him." 228
In sum, the Court rejected the imposition of liability on Evers
and others who had not directly participated in or authorized others to
engage in violent activities. As it emphasized, "[g]overnmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms may
be justified in certain narrowly defined instances." 229 Accordingly, the
Court limited the damages to those "proximately caused by the violence and threats of violence found to be present." 23 0 Because the
damage award was not so limited, the Court held that it lacked the

"precision" required by the First Amendment.2 31 The civil judgment
"compensate[d] respondents for the direct consequences of nonvio-

lent, constitutionally protected activity. "232
Summarizing these limits, the Court wrote, "The use of speeches,
marches, and threats of social ostracism cannot provide the basis for a
damages award. But violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection." 233 Although those who commit "violent deeds"
may be held liable for their conduct, "[t]he burden of demonstrating
223 Id. at 926.
224 Id. at 927-28.
225 Id. at 928.
226

Id.

227 Id. at 929.
228 Id.

Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
230 Id. at 921.
229

231

Id.

232 Id. at 923.
233 Id. at 933.
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that it colored the entire collective effort . . . is not satisfied by evidence that violence occurred or even that violence contributed to the
success of the boycott."2 3 4

The precision and narrowness requirements for tort liability extend to other actions. As noted, the Court has constitutionalized the
law of defamation. In the defamation context, a speaker is liable for
defamatory statements she or her agent or servant publish, but not for
statements published by others. 235 To hold speakers liable for merely
supporting or "liking" another's defamatory statement would expand
the reach of the defamation tort in ways similar to those that raised
First Amendment concerns in ClaiborneHardware.
5.

Students and Employees

Standards relating to the First Amendment rights of students and
public employees recognize limited protections for political speech in
some special contexts. With regard to the speech rights of students,
the Court has emphasized, "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism." 236 Thus, the First Amendment generally
prohibits officials from suppressing non-disruptive political speech on
school grounds. 237 For example, students can engage in peaceful and
silent forms of political protest on school property, such as wearing
armbands to express opposition to a war. 23 They may also have a First
Amendment right to make statements about matters of public concern, such as drug usage or drug policy, at school-sponsored events. 239
However, the scope and status of students' speech rights outside these
narrow contexts remains uncertain. Government employers cannot
discipline or fire employees for exercising First Amendment rights
they otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public concern, but they can subject employees to discipline or termination for
protest and other expressive activities that harm workplace efficiency,
public confidence, and office morale. 240
234

Id.

§ 577(1) cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1977).
236 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
235 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs,

237 See

id.

See id. at 514 (invalidating suspension of students for wearing black armbands to school
in protest of the Vietnam conflict).
239 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 403 (2007) (upholding student discipline in
connection with display of "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner, but suggesting that protests on
matters of public concern such as the legality of marijuana would be protected speech).
240 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
238
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With these general standards, principles, and values in mind, the
following Section examines more specifically how the First Amendment applies to various costs of dissent. It addresses these costs in
what are perceived to be their descending order of First Amendment

concern. Thus, the analysis starts with civil claims that likely violate
the First Amendment and then considers other costs and liabilities
that raise lesser but still significant First Amendment concerns.

B.

Civil Actions

As the Supreme Court's precedents emphasize, courts have a
"special obligation" to "examine critically" 241 civil claims to ensure
"precision of regulation" and to impose appropriate restraints on civil
actions and damage awards 2 42 "Negligent protest," "aiding and abetting defamation," "riot boosting," "conspiracy to protest," and "tortious petitioning" claims pose the most acute dangers to First
Amendment speech, assembly, and petition rights. They all impose a
form of collective rather than individual responsibility for protest activities, and thus fail the liability precision and tailoring guidance provided by the Court. Courts should therefore reject such claims.
1.

"Negligent Protest"
As discussed earlier, in Doe v. Mckesson, the Fifth Circuit al-

lowed a civil negligence claim to proceed against a Black Lives Matter
protest organizer, on the ground that he failed to exercise reasonable
care in protesting and proximately caused injuries sustained when a
participant threw a rock at a police officer. 243 The "negligent protest"
theory poses a significant threat to protest rights. It directly conflicts
with the First Amendment guidelines the Supreme Court announced
in Claiborne Hardware and, for the reasons discussed in that case,
threatens to chill protest organizing and participation. Accordingly,

courts should not permit plaintiffs to base protesters' liability on the
theory that they "negligently organized" a protest.
Recall that in Mckesson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the in-

jured police officer plausibly alleged that Mckesson "was negligent for
organizing and leading the Baton Rouge demonstration because he
'knew or should have known' that the demonstration would turn vio-

lent." 244 The court explained that Mckesson owed a duty of reasonable
241 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982).
242 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
243 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d 818, 828 (5th Cir. 2019).
244 Id. at 826.
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care to protesters, bystanders, and officers responding to the protest.245 Because it was foreseeable that the protest would involve some
protesters being unlawfully present in the street, which would in turn
entail interactions between protesters and police, the court reasoned
that it was also foreseeable that a participant would "pick[ ] up a piece
of concrete or a similar rock-like object" and throw it at one of the
officers. 246

Mckesson holds that protest organizers are liable for any foreseeable harms that occur at a public protest that involves even a minor
breach of peace. Under this theory, where a protest organizer leads
demonstrators who engage in any legal infraction, however minor, in-

cluding blocking a public street or sidewalk, it is foreseeable that police will be "required to respond to the demonstration" by clearing the
obstruction "and, when necessary, making arrests." 247 Further, according to the Fifth Circuit, "[g]iven the intentional lawlessness of this as-

pect of the demonstration," Mckesson and any similarly situated
protest organizer "should have known that leading the demonstrators
onto a busy highway was likely to provoke a confrontation between
police and the mass of demonstrators." 248 "By ignoring the foreseeable risk of violence that his actions created," the court reasoned,

"Mckesson failed to exercise reasonable care in conducting his demonstration." 249 Finally, the court held that by "provoking a violent confrontation with the police," Mckesson's actions were the factual and
250
proximate causes of the officer's injuries.
There are several fundamental problems with this conclusion.

First, the Fifth Circuit ignored ClaiborneHardware'sguidelines relating to the preservation of protesters' First Amendment rights. Clai-

borne Hardware held that organizers and participants can be liable
only for their own acts of violence or the acts of others they specifically direct or authorize.2' Thus, had Mckesson thrown the heavy object at the officer or directed someone to do so, the First Amendment
would not offer a defense. However, not only did he have no part in
the violence that occurred, Plaintiff Doe did not allege Mckesson ut-

tered a single word of encouragement to participants who might have
245 Id. at 827-28.
246 Id. at 823, 828.
247 Id. at 827.
248 Id.
249 Id.

250 Id. at 828.
251 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (concluding that civil
liability applied only to violent conduct chargeable to individual defendants).
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been inclined toward violence.252 Imposing liability on a protest orga-

nizer who directs or encourages a "negligent protest," when the organizer does not authorize, encourage, or ratify any acts of violence,
ignores the precision of regulation and narrow confines of protester
liability the Court insisted on in Claiborne Hardware. The Fifth Circuit failed to satisfy its "special obligation" to carefully consider the
First Amendment implications of the "negligent protest" theory.
Second, Mckesson is inconsistent with First Amendment precedents relating to a speaker's liability for the violent conduct of others.
Holding a protest organizer liable for damages he did not expressly

advocate and did not specifically intend to occur imminently violates
the speech-protective standard set out in Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 - 3
which imposed strict limits on liability for inciting imminent lawless
activity. 25 4

Third, the Fifth Circuit's decision is inconsistent with the broad
protections afforded freedom of assembly and association. Claiborne
Hardware specifically observed that "[t]he First Amendment ..

. re-

stricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely
because of his association with another." 25 5 The court's approach allows juries and courts to impose broad liability on protest organizers
and leaders, simply by virtue of their attendance at a protest event

that may draw hundreds or thousands of participants, counterprotesters, and participants. Under this standard, Mckesson and similarly situated protest organizers would face liability for merely belonging to
groups, "some members of which committed acts of violence." 25 6
"Negligent protest" imposes a form of guilt for association.
Fourth, as a liability standard, "negligent protest" lacks the care

and precision demanded under ClaiborneHardware. The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that Mckesson could be liable for the violence done by the
object-thrower based on his direction of tortious activity-i.e., his negligent planning of the protest. 25 7 As the Court has noted in other civil
liability contexts, including defamation, the negligence standard is far
too broad and imprecise to protect speech on matters of public con-

252 See Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d at 845 (willett, J., dissenting).
253 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
254 See id. at 447-48 (holding that speakers may be held liable for advocacy of violence
where they intend to incite imminent lawless acts and those acts are likely to occur).
255 ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at 918-19.
256

Id. at 920.

257 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d at 827.
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cern.258 Lower courts have also rejected the negligence standard as
inadequately protective of free speech and association rights. 25 9 As
one state appeals court observed, in a case involving targeted picketing of an abortion provider's residence, "[t]he specter of protesters
being subjected to unlimited liability for claims of negligent infliction
of emotional distress from a contingent of unknown plaintiffs would
doubtless have a stifling effect on [expression]."260 Indeed, as discussed earlier, in Snyder, the Court refused to allow injured plaintiffs
to sue public protesters even for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. 261 The "outrageousness" standard is simply too fluid, the Court
observed, to serve as the basis for liability where free speech is
concerned. 2 62

Similarly, with protest planning, the negligence tort's "reasonable
care" and "foreseeability" standards are far too imprecise to offer the
requisite protection for protest organizing. Encouraging protesters to
assemble on a public street, or even to "take the streets," cannot give
rise to civil liability for the violent actions of those who participate in
or attend protest events. 263 Claiborne Hardware does not authorize
civil damages for every violation of the myriad rules and regulations
applicable to protests. 2M If it did, protesters could be liable for considerable damages for engaging in non-violent and sometimes technical
violations. As Justice Gorsuch recently observed, in the context of a
public protest "almost anyone can be arrested for something." 265
Under the "negligent protest" liability theory, protest organizers
could face damages awards for hundreds of thousands of dollars or,
perhaps, more for merely planning to block a public street. Again, this
is not the sort of careful examination, precision, and restraint Clai258 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding proof of
actual malice required in libel suits brought by public officials against critics).
259 See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Mere negligence, therefore, cannot form the basis of liability under the incitement doctrine any more than
it can under libel doctrine."); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.w.2d 301, 309 (Tex. App. 1990), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 853 S.w.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (dismissing negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim brought by abortion provider whose home was picketed).
260 Valenzuela, 800 S.w. 2d at 309.
261 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011).
262 Id. at 458-59.
263 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing disorderly
conduct conviction where protester suggested participants should "take the fucking street later"
or "take the fucking street again").
264 See ZICK, supra note 139, at 191-96 (describing the development and content of detailed permitting regimes applicable to public protests).
265 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

2021]

THE COSTS OF DISSENT

273

borne Hardware requires when civil actions implicate First Amendment rights. Further, owing to its lack of precision, the "negligent
planning" liability theory invites juries and courts to make judgments
based on the content of the activists' messages, or the reputation of
their organizations, rather than negligence standards relating to duties
of care and foreseeability. Indeterminate liability standards like this
will inevitably chill public protest.
Finally, the "negligent protest" theory ignores the realities of the
contemporary protest environment. As recent police brutality protests
have shown, public protests are often fluid and complex events. They
cause disruption, public inconvenience, and offense. It is hardly uncommon for participants who are not part of the organizing group to
attend. The "negligent protest" theory holds protest leaders liable for
the consequences of any disruptive and unlawful acts that transpire at
public events. In fact, it authorizes holding leaders accountable for the
violence even of those opposed to the protest on the theory that such
violence was "foreseeable." Where passions run high, as they often do
at public protests, it is foreseeable that counterprotesters may engage
in unlawful and even violent acts. However, the fear of disruption that
attends public protests is a ground for protecting, rather than deterring, this kind of activity. 2 66 Mckesson's "negligent protest" theory not
only ignores protest realities, but also turns fundamental free speech
and assembly principles on their head by basing liability on the foreseeability of disruption.
The "negligent protest" action also allows law enforcement to
dictate the extent of protesters' liability exposure. As the court set the
scene in Mckesson, "[t]he Baton Rouge Police Department prepared
by organizing a front line of officers in riot gear."267 Recent protests
affirm that police departments frequently respond to even peaceful

protests with escalated force-beatings, use of chemical agents, and
firing of rubber bullets. 2 6 8 In Mckesson, it was the aggressive method
of protest policing, not the idea to block a public street, that ensured
some kind of confrontation with protesters would occur. Yet the
court's decision treats this show of force as a natural and "foresee266 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 ("Any word spoken
... that deviates from the views of another person may start ... a disturbance."); Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing that free speech may best serve its functions
"when it induces a condition of unrest").
267 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
268 See Stephen Gandel, At Least 40 Lawsuits Claim Police Brutality at George Floyd Protests Across U.S., CBS Naws (June 23, 2020, 2:06 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgefloyd-protests-police-brutality-settlements-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/8Q7D-SWBT].
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able" consequence of planning a protest in a street where protesters
were allegedly not supposed to assemble. As applied, the liability
standard allows government to stifle protest through law enforcement
decisions to use escalated force.
The Fifth Circuit's general response to all these concerns-that
the First Amendment "does not protect violence" 269-is inadequate
and ultimately beside the point. It is true that the First Amendment
does not protect protesters or protest leaders who themselves engage
in violent activities. It does not follow, and indeed Claiborne Hard-

ware rejected the proposition, that juries can impose all "foreseeable"
damages resulting from a protest organizer's alleged negligence. In-

deed, as Claiborne Hardware emphasized, "the nonviolent elements
of petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First

Amendment." 270 The Fifth Circuit was simply mistaken in asserting,
"[t]here is no indication in Claiborne Hardware or subsequent decisions that the Supreme Court intended to restructure state tort law by
eliminating" the "negligent protest" action. 271 That is precisely what
the Court intended, as it made clear by requiring that courts exercise
special care and precision in fashioning civil liability rules in the context of public protests.
All of this becomes clearer when one considers the effect "negligent protest" would have had on the civil rights movement. Indeed,
opponents of the civil rights movement tried on occasion to invoke

this theory against civil rights protesters. In Maxwell v. Southern
Christian Leadership Conference,272 decided in 1969, the Fifth Circuit-the same court that decided Mckesson-reviewed a $45,000
negligence judgment for a plaintiff injured during a civil rights protest.273 In Maxwell, the injured plaintiff, who sued the organizers of a
picket at a local supermarket, was a spectator shot while observing the

picket. 274 The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected defendant SCLC's argument that holding the association liable in tort for "negligent protest"

would jeopardize or chill lawful civil rights protests, although it ultimately reversed the judgment on proximate cause grounds. Indeed,

269 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d at 828 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 916 (1982)).
270 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982).
271 Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d at 829.
272 414 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1969).
273 See id. at 1066.
274 Id. at 1067.
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the court concluded, "[t]he First Amendment is simply not involved in
this case." 275 The court opined that where

emotions were charged, there were recent incidents with racial overtones, and there was a potentially if not probably
unmanageable number of participants ... [i]t may indeed be
negligent to foster a 'peaceful' demonstration ... or at least
to do so without proper safeguards, when it is reasonably
foreseeable that harm to persons or property might result. 276
However, the Maxwell court concluded that the specific chain of

events, which involved discharge of a weapon by a passing motorist,
was not reasonably foreseeable to the protest organizers. 277 Thus, relying solely on common law negligence principles, the court held that

the plaintiff's gunshot wounds were not the proximate cause of the
peaceful protest, but the cause of an intervening act-the shots fired
by the motorist when some protesters converged on his car in the su-

permarket parking lot.278
Maxwell brazenly ignored Sullivan's admonitions about the chilling effect of civil judgments, and the inadequacy of a negligence standard to protect speech on matters of public concern. The court's
insistence that the First Amendment is "simply not involved" in a case
involving liability for civil rights protesting ignores the historical fact
of plaintiffs weaponizing civil tort claims to defeat the civil rights
movement. If the court's view-whenever "emotions were charged,"
"racial overtones" were present, and a "potentially if not probably un-

manageable number of participants" were involved, negligence liability might be imposed-had prevailed, civil rights protest leaders
would have faced crushing civil damages claims for violence they
might well have foreseen but were not responsible for perpetrating. 279
Imposing negligence liability on protest organizers for failing to take

"proper safeguards" would have effectively invited juries to punish
civil rights activists for the "racial overtones" and "emotions" that
prevailed at such events. 280 Exposing civil rights activists to massive
civil liabilities and costs for violating segregation laws, court orders,

Id.
Id.
277 Id. at 1068 (footnote omitted).
275

276

278 Id.

279 See id. at 1067.
280 See id.
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and other regulations might have stifled civil rights activism ranging
from marches to sit-ins.2 81
Of course, the Maxwell court did not have the benefit of the Claiborne Hardware decision, which later clarified First Amendment limits on negligence and other forms of civil liability. The Fifth Circuit
cannot hide behind that same veil of ignorance in Mckesson. In that
case, Maxwell's description of the negligence "risk factors"-i.e.,
charged emotions, racial overtones, and potentially unmanageable
crowds-fits recent Black Lives Matter protests.2 82 The only difference was the Fifth Circuit's willingness to accept a theory of liability
the same court had grudgingly rejected six decades earlier.
Rejecting the Mckesson cause of action does not entail immunizing protesters from liability for all tortious acts, including some negligent acts. A protester who directly engages in intentional, reckless or
negligent behavior may be responsible for resulting damages. Thus, a
plaintiff could potentially sue a protest participant who wildly swings a
protest sign without regard to the safety of others standing nearby.
Similarly, a protester who ignored the health dangers of a pandemic
and government stay-at-home orders might be liable for infecting
others with a communicable virus (subject, of course, to contributory
2 83
and comparative negligence, assumption of risk, or other defenses).
A protester who blocks passage or physically assaults a speaker or
audience member intent on hearing the speaker may be liable for,
among other things, false imprisonment, assault, and battery-all
forms of harmful conduct, not expression. As well, a protest participant or supporter who directly and negligently defames a private citizen may be liable for reputational damages.
In any event, unlike the situation in Mckesson, which grounds liability on the foreseeability of the actions of third party participants,
counterprotesters, or even onlookers, the protest sign waver, virusspreader, heckler, and defamer would all be accountable only for
damages stemming from their own negligent, reckless, or intentional
acts. None of these hypothetical cases would involve the imposition of
281 See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (black students arrested for criminal
trespass for refusing to leave a restaurant).
282 See Doe v. Mckesson, 945 F.3d 818, 822-23 (5th Cir. 2019) (referring to "a string of
protests across the country, often associated with Black Lives Matter, concerning police
practices").
283 See generally Julie Bosman, Sabrina Tavernise & Mike Baker, Why These Protesters
Aren't Staying Home for Coronavirus Orders, N.Y. Tims (Apr. 24, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us/coronavirus-protesters.html [https://perma.cc/N6EU-YVUV].
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collective or vicarious liability on a protest organizer for "negligently
planning" an event.
2.

"Aiding and Abetting Defamation"

The Oberlin College lawsuit, in which the bakery owner recovered $44 million for defamatory statements allegedly "aided-and-abetted" by Oberlin officials, highlights the need for courts to review civil
liability with special care.284 In that case, the trial court allowed the
jury to impose liability on Oberlin not for publishing any defamatory
statements of its own regarding the bakery's allegedly racist practices,
but rather for supporting or facilitating the allegedly defamatory state-

ments made by some student protesters.285
Under that theory, a supporter of a Black Lives Matter or other
protest would be liable for defamation solely because of acts or statements that facilitated others in making false statements. That result

would raise similar concerns to the "negligent protest" and "riot
boosting" actions, discussed in the next section, which likewise pur-

port to impose liability on defendants for the actions of others. In the
defamation context, the publisher alone can be liable for damages resulting from defamatory statements.2 6 Further, courts must ensure
that damages are narrowly tailored to the conduct of the defendants-

a conclusion that seems impossible to reach based on Oberlin's own
alleged conduct, which at most facilitated distribution of student
speech.
3.

"Riot Boosting"

As discussed in Part I, states have demonstrated a growing appetite for enacting laws restricting public protest activities. Some recent
proposals involve increasing the potential civil liability of protest or-

ganizers and participants. Similar to the novel civil actions, courts
must carefully scrutinize these enactments to ensure they do not violate First Amendment protest rights.

Consider the offense of "riot boosting," recently enacted by
South Dakota's legislature. 2

7

As written, the law applies broadly to

speech and activities that support public protests. For example, it
would appear to apply even to a tweet encouraging environmental ac284 Appellants' Brief, supra note 60 at 3; see also Dickson, supra note 27.
285 See Appellants' Brief, supra note 60, at 3.
286 See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION,

LIBEL, SLANDER, AND

RELATED

PROBLEMS 2-98 (5th ed. 2020).
287 See S.B. 189, 2019 Leg., 94th Sess. (S.D. 2019); Malone & Eidelman, supra note 24.
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tivists to join a protest to stop a pipeline from being constructed, as
well as to protest training provided to environmental and other activ-

ists. Should a scuffle or other violence break out at a subsequent protest, both the tweeter and trainer may be civilly liable for any property
or personal injury damages. As the law does not clearly describe what

speech or conduct constitutes "riot boosting," the South Dakota law
and others like it lack the precision and clarity required under the
First Amendment.
In addition to troubling vagueness problems, "riot boosting" suf-

fers from some of the same First Amendment problems as the "negligent protest" action. As discussed in the context of that theory, states
can impose liability for inciting violence only in very narrow circumstances. 288 Although states can prohibit incitement to imminent vio-

lence, they cannot punish protest-related advocacy on the ground that
it "boosts" or supports a protest at which some violence ultimately
occurs. Rather, the protest organizer or assistant must specifically intend that the unlawful conduct occur and, in addition, the conduct
28 9
must be both imminent and likely to take place.
"Riot boosting" also imposes expansive civil liability on individuals who do not themselves engage in, direct, or authorize any violent
conduct. Potential "riot boosters" include the following:

"

Any organization that plans a protest about an issue on
which individuals have engaged in civil disobedience in
the past;

"

Any group that knows civil disobedience might occur at a
demonstration and decides to train protesters on how to
be peacefully arrested;

"

Any group that provides water or medical aid to protestors committing civil disobedience; and
Any individual who attends a planning meeting for a protest at which acts of civil disobedience occurred.

"

Imposing liability in this manner violates the First Amendment
right of association. As discussed, courts and juries cannot infer the
requisite intent from membership in the group or acts that may facilitate a group that engages in unlawful activity. 290 Rather, under the

288

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (describing incitement standard).

289

Id.

290 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ("[Q]uasi-political parties or other
groups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is
defined by its criminal purpose .... ").
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First Amendment, government must prove the actors intended to engage in the group's violent and unlawful activities. 291

Similar to the "negligent protest" actions, "riot boosting" imposes
civil liability based on fully protected-indeed traditionally prizedFirst Amendment activity. Under the circumstances, activists involved
with training, educating, or advising protest organizers may rationally
fear their actions will be characterized as unlawful "riot boosting."
The uncertainty of future events at public protests, coupled with

broad collective liability provisions, may deter organizers from participating in protest planning altogether. The potential for ruinous civil
awards will chill protected First Amendment activities.
"Conspiracy to Protest"

4.

In Claiborne Hardware, the Court observed that the prolonged
effort to change conditions in the community "cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent acts." 292 Thus, it wrote, "A court
must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better re-

vealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless
freestanding trees." 293
In some cases, however, protest participants may appear mostly
to be "reptiles." That is more than a fair description of the white
supremacists who came to Charlottesville, Virginia during the summer

of 2017. The so-called "Unite the Right" protests were ostensibly
about a peaceful protest relating to renaming a public park. As events
unfolded, however, the demonstrations turned into hateful and deadly
events.

294

A group of individuals who allege they suffered injuries at these
events is pursuing a civil action that implicates some of the concerns

addressed in the context of "negligent protest" and "riot boosting."
The case differs in important respects, and on its special facts it likely
does not pose the clear and present threat to First Amendment protest rights as these other claims. However, it does raise some concerns
about civil liability for protest organizing and participation. In that
respect, this novel civil action relates to the present discussion.
291 See id.
292 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982).
293 Id. at 934.
294

See

generally RODNEY

A. SMOLLA, CONFESSIONS OF A FREE SPEECH LAWYER: CHAR-

LOTrESVILLE AND THE POLrTICS OF HATE (2020)

Charlottesville).

(describing the pre- and post-protest events in
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Recall that in Sines v. Kessler, plaintiffs who attended the "Unite
the Right" rallies allege that protest leaders conspired with others to
harm them physically based on their support for African Americans,
Jews, and other minorities. 295 Claiborne Hardware admonishes courts
to take special care to distinguish the First Amendment-protected aspects of concerted action from its unlawful components. 296 To repeat,
courts have a "special obligation" to "examine critically" civil causes
of action and to make sure legal standards are precise and allow for
civil liability only in narrow circumstances. 2 97

Before considering the specific context in Sines, a couple of important, if obvious, points should be made. First, it cannot be a violation of federal or state law to "conspire" with others to organize a
peaceful and non-violent protest. As ClaiborneHardwareemphasized,
this is the essence of the expressive association right protected by the
First Amendment. 298 The line between an unlawful conspiracy, on the
one hand, and efforts to organize a lawful public protest, on the other,
can sometimes be unclear. Indeed, this was true in Claiborne Hardware itself, which involved an economic boycott featuring both lawful
and unlawful conduct. However, it is incumbent on courts to separate
these two types of events. Second, to the extent that protest leaders or
participants engaged in violence or expressly incited others to do so
imminently, the First Amendment provides no defense to civil liability.299 Further, if the protest leaders entered into an agreement to engage in specific violent acts, they may be liable for the harmful
consequences of that conspiracy. 300 However, as discussed, Claiborne
Hardware requires specific proof of an intent to conspire with others
and limits damages to the direct consequences of this unlawful activity. In short, courts and juries cannot rely on the organization of the
protest, membership in the protest groups, or the reptilian nature of
the actors as a basis for civil liability.
Navigating these distinctions is required in order to distinguish a
"conspiracy to protest," which is lawful and protected by the First
Amendment, from conspiracies to violate civil rights or engage in
other unlawful acts, which are not. Thus, the lawful aspect of the de295 See Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 783-95 (w.D. Va. 2018) (describing allegations
of conspiracy to violate civil rights).
296 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 907-09 (discussing expressive and unlawful aspects
of economic boycott).
297

298
299

Id. at 915-16.
Id. at 908.
See id. at 916.

300 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 783-84.
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fendants' agreement in Sines was to assemble and protest the renaming of a park in Charlottesville. In the course of planning the
demonstrations, and subsequently in executing those plans, organizers, participants, and others communicating in social media forums, some moderated by the defendants, advocated violent conduct
or later engaged in violent acts. 301 The difficulty in Sines, as in Claiborne Hardware, lies in separating the protected activities of speech
and assembly from any unlawful conduct-including any agreement to
deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights.
As in Mckesson, the Sines court decided a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims and did not reach their merits. 302 Nevertheless, even

in this posture, the plaintiffs' claim and the district court's assessment
of it raise serious First Amendment concerns. To be clear, the point is
not that a public protest or protest movement can never provide the
basis for a conspiracy to violate civil rights or other laws. Rather, the
concern is that the evidence for this claim must not consist primarily of
allegations that defendants organized, promoted, or participated in an
otherwise peaceful public protest, or that they engaged in protected
speech during the planning or execution of the protest.

In light of these limits, there are several notable things about the
Sines court's findings and conclusions. First, the court correctly rejected the plaintiffs' contention that "all rally attendees who disagreed
with them were part of one overarching conspiracy." 303 Second, it rejected as "conclusory labeling" the plaintiffs' allegations that all individuals who posted statements on social media were "coconspirators."304 Consistent with Claiborne Hardware, the court demanded specific evidence of conspiratorial actions taken by individual
defendants. 3 5
With regard to the specific factual allegations, the complaint alleges that some of the individual defendants engaged in violent acts at
the rallies-throwing torches, participating in personal assaults, and
most infamously driving a car into a group of protesters.306 As Claiborne Hardware makes clear, the First Amendment does not protect
301 See id. at 784-95 (reviewing allegations concerning each individual defendants' actions).
302 See id. at 773.
303 See id. at 784.
304 Id.

Id. at 804.
See, e.g., id. at 787 (allegations that defendant Cantwell personally attacked counterprotesters with mace and committed assault); id. at 790 (allegation that defendant Damigo assaulted counterprotesters).
305
306
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these acts of violence or threats to commit violence. 307 However, as

the Court has also made clear, some violence occurring at the rallies is
not a valid basis for condemning the entire collective enterprise as an
unlawful conspiracy or imposing liability on all organizers and participants.308 Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights in a manner distinct
from their agreement to organize a lawful protest.

This is where things get trickier. The complaint's allegations of an
unlawful conspiracy to violate plaintiffs' civil rights-including the
statutorily required racial animus and overt acts-significantly overlap
with allegations concerning organizing, planning, and participating in
the rallies. Indeed, many of the plaintiffs' allegations refer to actions

taken by defendants to organize or publicize the rallies, which again
had the lawful purpose of demonstrating against renaming a public
park. 309 These activities include planning and participating in meetings
among various defendants, sometimes in person but primarily online,
urging members of various groups to attend the events, and advising
on protest strategies and tactics. As in the context of the economic
boycott in Claiborne Hardware, the First Amendment protects all
these activities. The significant overlap between the allegations supporting the claim of unlawful conspiracy and acts such as organizing,

planning, and publicizing the rallies raises the possibility that a jury or
court could impose civil liability for assembly and other collective activities protected by the First Amendment.
Further, although many of the allegations concerned lawful planning activities, the court reasoned that in light of the violence that
later occurred, it could construe these planning meetings as part of the
unlawful conspiracy. 310 In this respect, the district court imputed a

kind of retroactive intent to the defendants, even though the conspiracy claim required an advance meeting of the minds. Under this the307 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
308 Id. at 920.
309 See Sines, 324 F. Supp.3d at 784 (applying for permit and inviting participants); id. at 785
(inviting participants and organizing participation); id. at 787 (telling participants to march in
formation); id. at 787 (using social media to "coordinate attendance" and instructing marchers to
wear specific attire); id. at 789 (publishing content "in support of the rally" and contributing to
planning of the rally); id. at 790 (meeting with other defendants to organize the rally); id. at 791
(using website to plan rallies); id. at 792 (using social media to communicate with participants);
id. at 793 (meeting with other defendants to march in formation at rally); id. at 794 (promotion
of event).
310 See, e.g., id. at 788 (interpreting defendant Vanguard America's rhetoric in light of later
acts of violence); id. at 790 (reasoning that defendant Damigo's arrest for violent acts at the rally
demonstrated conspiratorial intent).
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ory, the jury might impute unlawful conduct that transpires at a

protest to organizers who may not have demonstrated the requisite
intent.

In addition, Sines involves vicarious and collective liability concerns. ClaiborneHardware admonishes courts to limit protester liability to "wrongful conduct chargeableto the defendants."311 As the Court
emphasized, only "a judgment tailored to the consequences of [protesters'] unlawful conduct may be sustained." 312 Although there was certainly chatter about violence during the organizational phase,

particularly in online fora, plaintiffs attributed little of the chatter directly to the named defendants. Rather, discussions of violence or potential violence consisted mostly of anonymous comments and posts
that the court linked to defendants by virtue of their moderation or

operation of websites or social media pages. 313 Under ClaiborneHardware, although defendants can be liable for their own unlawful communications they are not liable for the communications of third
parties-including anonymous social media commenters.

The Sines complaint contains many allegations that defendants
engaged in the sort of harsh rhetoric Evers communicated in Claiborne Hardware.314 However, rather than treating this offensive and
derogatory rhetoric as an insufficient basis for imposing liability, as

the Supreme Court did in Claiborne, the Sines court relied on it to
establish the existence of an unlawful conspiracy. To be clear, many of

these communications were deeply offensive and hateful. However, as
the Court concluded in Claiborne Hardware, so long as they do not
threaten others or incite imminent unlawful acts, the First Amendment protects these communications.
Although the district court acknowledged that when lawful protest activities form part of the basis of civil liability courts must nar-

rowly define legal standards, it interpreted the Supreme Court's
precedents quite broadly. None of the statements referred to in the
complaint meets the narrow definitions of threats, incitement, or other

uncovered speech categories. However, the court consistently took
the position that the First Amendment did not protect the defendants'
311 ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at 918 (emphasis added).
312 Id. at 926.
313 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (noting the defendant Kessler "allowed" derogatory and
potentially threatening comments on the platform).
314 See, e.g., id. at 785-86, 788 (noting allegations that defendants were performing Nazi
salutes, chanting "Blood and Soil," "making monkey noises at black counter-protesters," posting
article on website that stated "it's time to dominate the streets," made a post-rally comment that
"[w]e're ready to close ranks and fight for what is ours," and posting violent drawings).
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derogatory communications, or those made by their supporters. 315 For
example, comments relied on by the district court included advice to

be prepared for "self-defense" in light of planned counter-protests, to
wear khaki pants and polo shirts because these were a "good fighting
uniform," and to be "dressed and ready for action" and prepared to
"dominate the streets." 316 Other comments used military and battle
jargon, referring to protesters as "warriors" and "fighters" and urging
participants to "[b]ring as much gear and weapons as you can within
the confines of the law." 317 As the Supreme Court has recognized,
however, tall talk and charged rhetoric like this constitutes protected
speech. 318
Allegations in the complaint do point to some specific instances
in which defendants communicated in ways that a court could conclude were unlawful. Statements made at the rallies that certain groups
should "charge" at counterprotesters or engage in specific acts of violence constitute unlawful incitement and can form the basis of civil
liability. 319 However, these statements were not part of an advance
agreement-a conspiracy-to engage in violent conduct at the rallies.
If, as Claiborne Hardware suggests, one treats the allegations of
protest organization and the derogatory rhetoric as protected expression, the remaining evidence of a conspiracy to engage in violent acts
appears to be relatively thin (although, again, allegations can ripen
into evidence at trial). The Sines court recognized its obligation to
parse carefully the plaintiffs' multitude of allegations. 320 However, in
places its reasoning comes perilously close to assigning liability based
on a "conspiracy to protest" theory. That theory, like "negligent protest" and "riot boosting," raises a significant concern that the.basis for
civil liability could be disapproval of the derogatory and hateful
speech that characterized and fueled the rallies rather than the entry
of an unlawful conspiracy.
315 See id. at 785 (using hateful comments by defendants to demonstrate an agreement to
engage in racially motivated violence); id. at 789 (characterizing comment at the rally relating to
"ovens" as a true threat).
316 Id.

at 787, 792, 786.

317 Id. at 786, 792 (alteration in original).
318 See, e.g., watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (reversing conviction for
threatening the President and observing "[t]he language of the political arena, like the language
used in labor disputes, is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact." (citation omitted)).
319 Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 785.
320 Id. at 803-04 (recognizing that the court was obligated to engage in "careful parsing of
the allegations" and suggesting it had applied a "heightened standard" to the complaint).
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This is not to excuse, much less validate, the vile statements made
by some of the defendants and their followers in Sines. However, hard
cases sometimes make bad law. At a minimum, the case demonstrates
why courts must exercise special care and insist on precision in the
context of assigning public protest liability. Either at trial or on appeal, it will be necessary to pin down more narrowly the basis for conspiracy liability. 32 1
Whatever the outcome in Sines, the concern is that future plain-

tiffs might invoke something like a "conspiracy to protest" theory
under state civil conspiracy laws or common law. Indeed, governments

have long used conspiracy charges to target protesters.3 22 Civil conspiracy actions raise serious First Amendment concerns relating to im-

position of collective liability for otherwise protected speech and
assembly.3 23 Accordingly, courts must not recognize or authorize any
cause of action for "conspiracy to protest."
5.

"Tortious Petitioning"

One final civil claim that raises serious First Amendment concerns is what I have referred to as "tortious petitioning." As discussed
earlier, in recent cases courts have allowed claims to proceed based on

allegations that defendants interfered with business relations by directly petitioning government officials.3 24
This theory of civil liability is flatly inconsistent with the First
Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances.3 25
Imposing liability in tort based on communications between citizens
and officials, in which individuals criticize public polices, strikes at the
321 See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2003) (limiting
liability under RICO to acts taken with an economic motive); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 930-32 (1982) (discussing First Amendment limits on the assessment of derivative liability against ideological organizations); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 466 (1958) (invalidating under the First Amendment a court order compelling production of
the NAACP's membership lists); Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir.
1991) (applying a heightened pleading standard to a complaint based on presumptively protected First Amendment conduct).
322 See generally David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 189 (1972).
323 See Chip Gibbons, The Prosecution of Inauguration-DayProtesters Is a Threat to Dissent, NATION (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-prosecution-of-inau(describing
guration-day-protesters-is-a-threat-to-dissent/ [https://perma.cc/2VXN-AQMZ]
"conspiracy to riot" charges, based on protected expression such as chanting and marching,
brought against hundreds of inauguration day protesters).
324 See supra Section I.B.4.
325 See generally RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, Jr., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE
(2012).
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heart of the First Amendment. If the central meaning of the free

speech guarantee is that citizens have a First Amendment right to criticize government officials in the performance of official duties, they
must also be free to communicate those criticisms directly without

fear of ruinous civil liability judgments. 326 Holding speakers liable for
business damages stemming from otherwise lawful petitioning activities violates the First Amendment.

One response might be that the First Amendment does not prohibit government from punishing speakers for making false statements
that result in private or collective harms, so that petitioning liability
might lie for false statements. 327 In fact, lying to a public official can

sometimes be the basis for criminal or civil liability-for example,
when the falsehood leads to the obtaining of some personal benefit or
undermines justice. 328 Further, falsehoods about public officials that
harm reputation can sometimes lead to civil damages, even under a

heightened standard of liability. 329
However, the right to communicate grievances to government officials has never been limited to the communication of factually accurate or truthful statements. Imposing civil liability for false statements

made in the course of petitioning government officials would severely
chill speech at the core of the First Amendment. The resulting deterrence may extend to whistleblowing in the context of government contracts, complaints about fraudulent spending, and other matters about
which we want individuals to freely petition officials. A petitioner who
makes a false statement while presenting a complaint or criticizing an
official at a town hall meeting might face extensive damages for the
consequences of that act, particularly where there is harm to business

interests. For instance, if the false statement involves a proposed stadium or other business project officials decline to pursue, the peti-

tioner could be liable for the economic losses of the project
participants.

326 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
327 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (rejecting theory that falsehoods are categorically unprotected speech but allowing
that speakers can be liable for falsehoods that cause tangible harms).
328 See id. at 723 (plurality opinion) ("Where false claims are made to effect a fraud or
secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say, offers of employment, it is well established
that the Government may restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment."); id. at
734-35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to perjury and false statements made
to government officials).
329 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
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As discussed earlier, one state appellate court has tried to account for First Amendment concerns in this context by grafting an
"actual malice" limitation onto the interference with business relations tort in the petitioning context. 330 This, however, does not cure
the First Amendment concerns associated with such liability. The "actual malice" standard still allows courts to impose liability for state-

ments made to public officials in the course of their official duties.
This would force petitioners to defend themselves against charges that

they engaged in what is essentially reckless lobbying of public officials.
If an affected business can show that petitioner's statements were the

product of reckless research or misinformation that the petitioner
could have avoided, she may be liable in tort for millions of dollars in
damages.
Even under this standard, petitioning officials would be a very
risky proposition. Moreover, the result would be directly contrary to
the central purpose underlying adoption of the "actual malice" standard elsewhere, as in the defamation context-namely, to ensure

"that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." 331 The Supreme Court has recognized this concern in other
contexts, including application of the federal antitrust laws, which it
has specifically interpreted to exempt lobbying activities. 332 Civil libertarians, environmental activists, whistleblowers, and other petitioners

ought not to face civil liability for engaging with public officials on
matters of public concern. With or without an "actual malice" standard, civil actions based on petitioning activities are inconsistent with
First Amendment values and violate the right to petition government

for redress of grievances.
C.

Civil Penalty Enhancements

As noted, one of the central concerns with civil liability is that
significant damage awards will chill protest activity. This makes en-

hanced damage provisions and awards of punitive damages a special
First Amendment concern. Although the First Amendment does not

shield protesters from liability for trespass and other civil wrongs,
courts ought to be mindful of First Amendment values when applying
330 See Hurchalla v. Lake Point Phase I, LLC, 278 So. 3d 58, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
331 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
332 See, e.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
137-38 (1961) (holding that antitrust laws do not apply to businesses combining to lobby the
government, even where such conduct has an anticompetitive purpose and effect, because the
alternative "would raise important constitutional questions" under the First Amendment).
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enhanced and special damage assessments to protest activities. These
damages, which can rise to millions of dollars, impose heavy costs on
activists-in some cases even when they engage in minimally disruptive forms of civil disobedience.
As discussed earlier, several states have proposed increased civil
penalties for trespass and other minor civil infractions and application
of civil forfeiture laws to protesters' assets. 333 Many states did so in
direct response to high-profile protest events, including minimum
wage demonstrations, indigenous protests of the Standing Rock pipeline, Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson, Missouri, and protests
relating to Donald Trump's election. 334 That does not subject the laws
to challenge as content-based regulations of speech. However, protesters can still challenge the laws based on vagueness, overbreadth, and
lack of tailoring. A law that penalizes protest anywhere along hundreds of miles of pipeline may well be subject to these kinds of
attacks.
The penalty enhancements themselves raise significant First
Amendment concerns. Protesters sometimes rely on acts of civil disobedience, including occupying land or disabling equipment. 335 Environmental and other protests sometimes rely on the concept of
expressive lawbreaking, which involves engaging in minor infractions

like these. 336 Increasing civil fines and penalties would punish and may
suppress peaceful, but technically unlawful, protest activities. Mea-

sures that enhance penalties for even minor trespass and other infractions impose liability far disproportionate to any public or private
harm actually suffered.
333

See discussion supra Part I.C.

334 See Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access
Pipeline, MOTHER JONEs (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/
[https://perma.cc/
2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-sioux-standing-rock-jill-stein/
RBU2-SESY] (examining the events that led to the pipeline protests); Monica Davey & Julie
Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TmIrEs (Nov. 24,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-browngrand-jury.html [https://perma.cc/C9DS-T4DX] (explaining events that led to the Ferguson protests); Gregory Krieg, Police Injured, More Than 200 Arrested at Trump Inauguration Protests in
DC, CNN (Jan. 21, 2017, 4:06 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/19/politics/trump-inaugurationprotests-womens-march/index.html [https://perma.cc/5AZ4-445S] (examining events surrounding arrests of protesters at Trump inauguration).
335 See, e.g., Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. wade, 857 P.2d 101, 105 (Or. 1993) (in
banc) (finding protestors climbed on and chained themselves to plaintiff's logging equipment
without permission).
336 See generally Jacobs, supra note 17 (challenging distinction between speech and conduct
in context of expressive lawbreaking, including acts of civil disobedience).
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As applied to minor acts of civil disobedience, such as trespass to
land or chattels, penalty enhancements would burden public protest in
ways out of all proportion to the actual harms they cause. Similar con-

cerns arise with respect to the award of punitive damages in protest
cases. The First Amendment may not generally prohibit such awards.

However, Claiborne Hardware imposes a "special obligation" on
courts to ensure that they impose civil damages in a manner aimed at

compensating for actual harms and not to suppress protest. 337
As in other liability contexts, while protesters are liable for engaging in tortious conduct, courts should be mindful of the close con-

nection between speech and nonviolent tortious conduct. They ought
also to recognize the harsh deterrent effect massive civil awards can
have on the exercise of protest rights. For example, in the context of

an environmental protest, the communicative aspect of climbing on
logging equipment or occupying an access road is not negligible. In
such cases, an award of punitive damages punishes the protesters at
least in part for their communication. 338 Insofar as a civil damages
award may have this effect, courts ought to limit damages for expressive forms of misconduct.
D.

Fees and Other Administrative Costs
As discussed in Part I, governments regularly charge fees and

sometimes impose other costs on protesters and demonstrators. Permit and rental fees, cleanup deposits, hold-harmless agreements, and
insurance liability requirements increasingly have become ordinary

costs of public protest. 339 These costs place considerable financial burdens on those planning and organizing protests 3O
The Supreme Court has said very little about the constitutionality
of permit fees and other costs. It has indicated that the First Amend-

ment does not bar governments from charging flat fees for permits,
which indicates that governments can recoup at least some of the costs
associated with protests.3 1 However, the Court has held that govern337 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982).
338 Cf. wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (upholding hate crimes enhancement
on the ground that enhancement was not tied to the message of the crime but rather the underlying conduct). In Mitchell, the conduct in question was a criminal assault, which does not itself
express any message entitled to First Amendment consideration or protection. In the environmental or political protest context, the protest itself is entitled to free speech and assembly protection, even if the underlying trespass is not.
339 See Neisser, supra note 11, at 269-72 (describing various costs).
340 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 789-90.
341 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941). For an argument that these fees
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ments cannot vest broad discretion in officials to impose variable fees
based on predictions about how much disruption, or litter, or violence
will attend a particular protest.3 4 2 That sort of scheme invites content
discrimination forbidden by the First Amendment.34 3 Thus, any fee or

cost schedule that varies the costs of protest, or provides broad discretion to officials to do so, violates the First Amendment. This includes
schemes that impose costs after the fact, or allow a locality to seek
reimbursement subsequent to an event. 3"4 These schemes are invalid

because they charge protesters variably, based on reactions to their
speech and other content concerns. 345
The Court has never decided whether a permit scheme must provide a waiver for protesters unable to afford applicable fees and costs.
Doubtless part of the reason for that is that permit schemes often contain waiver provisions for those who demonstrate they are unable to
pay. Some courts have held that a waiver for indigent permit applicants is required under the First Amendment, while others have
reached the opposite conclusion.3"6
At the next opportunity, the Court should hold that the First
Amendment requires an indigency exception. In the absence of such a
holding, all localities should allow access to protest venues without
regard to ability to pay. The Court itself has indicated that "[f]reedom
of speech . . . [must be] available to all, not merely to those who can
pay their own way."3 4 7 Courts that have rejected an indigency require-

ment are comforted by the notion that at least in their cases the protests can still go on-perhaps not in the plaza where people gather,
violate the First Amendment, see C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory
ParadePermits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 1024 (1983).
342 See Forsyth County. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1992).
343 Id. at 134-35.
344 See Nationalist Movement v. City of York, 481 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2007) (invalidating
reimbursement provision that allowed city to charge speaker for costs relating to audience reaction to speech).
345 Id. at 186-87.

.

346 Cases requiring an indigency exception include Nationalist Movement, 481 F.3d at 184,
and Central FloridaNuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1985).
But see Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 41, 43-45 (1st Cir. 2007) ("where, as here, ..
there are ample alternative forums for speech, we see insufficient justification for the district
court's ruling that the Constitution mandates an indigency exception .... "); Stonewall Union v.
City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Because we believe the availability of
the sidewalks and parks provides a constitutionally acceptable alternative for indigent paraders,
we find that the lack of an indigency exception does not render the ordinance constitutionally
invalid.").
347 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
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but on the sidewalks or streets in the neighborhood. 34 8 However, that

is cold comfort to protesters treated as second class based solely on
their inability to pay. But for their inability to post a bond or pay a
fee, the plaintiff protesters would be entitled to the same First
Amendment right as other groups.

The Court has also never decided a case involving a challenge to
the amount of a fee or cost. Pursuant to the guidelines set forth in

Claiborne Hardware, courts have a special obligation to review all
such costs to ensure they do not suppress lawful and protected expression. Some courts have invalidated particular costs owing to lack of
specificity or lack of relationship to any strong governmental inter-

est. 349 However, in some instances, administrative costs could ripen
into an effective prohibition on protest. Should officials start charging
thousands of dollars in permitting and other costs without providing
for such waivers, then courts ought to invalidate such schemes under
the First Amendment. Even with a waiver, protesters with means to
pay may well decide it is not worth the expense. Again, ability to pay
should not determine the exercise of First Amendment protest rights.

Like participation in the electoral process, public protest should not
be an option only for the wealthy. 350 At the very least, courts should
require that costs and bond amounts that exceed an individual or

group's ability to pay must be reduced. 351
Whether the costs of policing or otherwise allowing a public protest, in a public park or on a college campus, can become so high as to
constitute a compelling governmental interest in imposing limits on

expression is another open question. Again, the Court has not offered
any guidance. However, any expressive limit would have to be carefully calibrated to avoid imposing a "heckler's veto," which again

would allow predicted reactions to certain speakers to serve as the
basis for excluding them from public places otherwise open to
expression. 352
See Sullivan, 511 F.3d at 45.
349 See, e.g., Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010,
1032-34 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding some costs but holding that charges for "litter abatement"
and "traffic control" were invalid).
350 See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (upholding Texas law regarding
eligibility of officials to run for another public office by distinguishing cases requiring fee from
candidates that may unconstitutionally burden candidates of lower economic status); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (holding selection of candidates solely on ability to pay filing
fees unconstitutionally excludes candidates who are unable to pay).
351 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 781 n.29 (reaching the same conclusion, although acknowledging a lack of judicial authority).
352 See Michael C. Dorf, Reconsidering the Heckler's Veto Principle, DORF ON LAw (Nov.
348
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One particular cost burden-proof of liability insurance or an insurance mandate-is fundamentally at odds with Claiborne Hardware's limitation of damages for protected activities and
associations. 353 Courts should invalidate such requirements on First
Amendment grounds. 354 Insurance mandates transfer the costs of
wrongdoing from third party (including intentional) tortfeasors to protest sponsors and organizers. 355 In that sense, they raise First Amendment concerns similar to the "negligent protest" and "riot boosting"
actions. 356 Moreover, requiring liability insurance for intentional (or
negligent) conduct by protest participants raises questions of differential treatment. Why are only protests and demonstrations subject to
such coverage requirements?

35 7

Insurance mandates also threaten as-

sociational rights. As one commentator has observed, "Mandatory liability insurance for special events thus creates a regulatory distinction

based precisely on a particular form of constitutionally protected activity-public association-typical of those with dissident perspectives. It therefore must fall as a most insidious and unusual form of
content discrimination.1"35
As commentators have long observed, administrative fees and
costs raise serious concerns about differential taxation, imposition of
unconstitutional prior restraints, and suppression of minority and
other dissident associations. 359 However, as noted, there is a Supreme
360
Court vacuum in the area of administrative costs. As a result, it is
difficult to say definitively which fees and costs violate the First
Amendment. Some answers seem plausible based on the Court's

guidance. 361
This uncertainty does not compel officials to pile up costs or shift
them onto protesters. It is within their power to fund these activities,
22, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/11/reconsidering-hecklers-veto-prnciple.html [https://perma.cc/W8VY-UKAQ] (suggesting that there may be a threshold amount
which would qualify as a "compelling interest" for limiting campus speech).
353 See Neisser, supra note 11, at 301-02 (discussing First Amendment implications of insurance requirements).
354 See iMatter Utah v. Njord, 774 F.3d 1258, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating insurance liability requirement for parade).
355 See id.
356 See supra Part III.B.1, 3.
357 See Neisser, supra note 11, at 308-10.
358 Id. at 311.
359 See id. at 330-42 (discussing various First Amendment problems associated with police
service fees); 343-44 (arguing against cleanup deposits on First Amendment grounds).
360 See supra Section III.A.1.
361 See supra Section III.D.
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and they should do so. Whether or not particular costs violate the First

Amendment, free speech and association values indicate that taxpayers ought to continue to bear most of the costs of collective expression. 3 62 As one critic of user fees and other protest costs argued, "[I]f
the [F]irst [A]mendment is to assure a safety valve for dissatisfaction,

genuine discussion of public policy, ascertainment of new scientific
truths or cultural forms, and individual self-development, the public
system of expression must, at a minimum, avoid replicating the private
market's price structure and thereby reinforcing its inequities." 3 63

If governments wish to avoid the costs and damages associated
with certain kinds of protests, they have ample means at their disposal
to do so without shifting the costs of dissent onto protest organizers.
and sponsors. These include objective permit regulations, enhanced
security, and more efficient and effective protest policing. The increased costs of securing and maintaining places of protest should not
fall on the shoulders of those seeking to engage in constitutionally

protected activities.
E.

Education and Employment

A final set of First Amendment concerns relates to the consequences of protest activity for public students and public employees.
In these particular contexts, the concern is not the direct imposition of
damages but rather the economic and other consequences relating to
loss of educational and employment opportunities.
Students at all levels engage in protest activity, both on and off
school premises. 364 As in the other contexts discussed in this Article,

courts have a special obligation to preserve the protest rights of public-school students. Students are learning to be citizens, and part of
that learning entails understanding the rights and responsibilities of
self-government. The Supreme Court has emphasized that schools

cannot be "enclaves of totalitarianism" or treat students as "closedcircuit recipients" of information. 365
Of course, school officials have important interests in pedagogy,
discipline, and order. The current First Amendment standards applicable to student speech recognize these interests. Current doctrine preserves students' rights to protest on school premises so long as it is
362 See Dorf, supra note 352 (discussing campus cost-shifting problem).
363 Neisser, supra note 11, at 297.
364 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (reversing
expulsion for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam war).
365 Id.
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366
done in a manner not disruptive to the learning environment. Owing to the special context, that standard is less precise than the First

Amendment generally demands in the context of other protests. Even

under the current standard, officials ought not to discipline students
for acts of protest and dissent that do not raise any realistic prospect
of disruption. As importantly, courts should treat student expression
that occurs off school premises, including during demonstrations and
protests, as fully protected by the First Amendment-whether or not
the activity is consistent with school policies or causes some disruption
at school.
The more acute danger in terms of student speech relates to col-

lege and university attendees. Like other school authorities, university
officials retain broad authority to impose curricular requirements; regulate the time, place, and manner of expression on campus; and punish students who engage in violent conduct. However, they ought not
to discipline students for peaceful protest activities on their campuses
that do not disrupt learning. Moreover, they ought to create abundant

space on campus for peaceful forms of protest rather than limit students to ill-defined or geographically unattractive locations.
Further, when drafting and enforcing disruptive conduct policies,
administrators ought to be careful to preserve students' public protest
rights both on and off campus. As Claiborne Hardware instructs, this
entails drafting with precision and ensuring that officials do not define
terms such as "disrupt" and "interfere" so broadly as to effectively
7
prohibit campus counter-protests. 36
Recently adopted campus policies relating to disruption of scheduled activities, including interference with invited speakers, raise the
danger that officials will impose student discipline for constitutionally
protected counter-speech. 368 Fearful of mandatory punishments, including expulsion, students may decide not to organize or participate
in protest activity on campus. Given its harshness and consequences,
lawmakers and university administrators should consider expulsion a
last and least attractive alternative to non-disciplinary outcomes-in-

cluding conversations with students about the importance of hearing
different views and freedom of speech on campus. Expulsion or suspension should rarely be the price students pay for engaging in
dissent.
366 Id.

367 See generally Abu El-Haj, Defining Peaceably, supra note 3, at 967-80; see also NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
368 See INT'L CTR. FOR NON-PROFIT L., supra note 129.
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Public employees are an important source of criticism and dissent, particularly owing to their access to information about the work-

ings of government. 369 They may also be activists on their own time,
outside of the work context. 370 Like students, public employees do not
waive their First Amendment rights by virtue of accepting public employment. However, current First Amendment doctrine protects em-

ployees who speak as citizens on matters of public concern only
through an imprecise balancing standard in which courts weigh First

Amendment rights of employees against employer concerns relating
to office efficiency and discipline. 371 Too often, this approach allows
employers to discipline employees for political expression.
In some cases, employers may feel they have little choice but to
terminate employees for off-site expression. For example, police departments must have the power to dismiss employees who engage in
racially derogatory demonstrations outside of the workplace, because
this activity will undermine community trust and effective policing. 372
Recently, employers fired a Federal Express employee and suspended
a corrections officer after the pair mocked the murder of George

Floyd during a public protest. 373 With respect to the civil servant, the
First Amendment again provides discretion precisely for such
instances.
However, public employers ought not to enjoy unbridled discretion to discipline or terminate employees whose protest or other expression they do not like. In some cases, courts have held that

employers may terminate aides when they engage in offensive or
other public expression likely to be associated with the employer. 374
That type of authority would give employers the power to terminate
employees for taking part in political rallies and demonstrations, or
369 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (observing that by virtue
of their positions, public employees have special access to information of vital importance to the
public).
370 Id. at 568.
371 See id.
372 See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 180 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of NYPD
and FDNY employees who took part in a parade while wearing blackface and engaging in other
racially derogatory expression).
373 Jessica Chasmar, FedEx Employee Fired, Corrections Officer Suspended Over Video Reenacting George Floyd Killing, WASH. TIMEs (June 10, 2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2020/jun/10/fedex-employee-fired-corrections-officer-suspended/ [https://perma.cc/7TANWEY8].
374 See, e.g., Gordon v. Griffith, 88 F. Supp. 2d 38, 57-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
state assemblyman could terminate aide for comments at a public rally concerning police
brutality).
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posting content to social media, based solely on employer concerns
about attribution.375 If public employees are to retain their right to
protest and dissent, employers must not predicate workplace discipline on the viewpoint of the employee or the employer's disagree-

ment with her political or social causes.
As these contexts show, the potential costs of dissent extend beyond imposition of monetary fees and damages. Individuals may place

important educational interests and even their livelihoods at risk simply by engaging in public protest activities. The Court likely will not

adopt more precise First Amendment standards in terms of students'
and employees' expression. However, it is important for educators,
government employers, and courts not to allow officials to burden
protest rights except in clear cases of tangible educational or workplace disruption.
CONCLUSION

The nation has just witnessed the immense power and many perils of mass protest. Beneath the surface of the police brutality and
racial justice protests lies a regulatory framework that imposes signifi-

cant costs and liabilities on protest organizers, participants, and supporters. Plaintiffs may yet sue Black Lives Matter and other activists
involved in the protests for civil damages. Whether they do or not, it is
likely that the protests will spur legislative backlash in the form of
additional civil penalties for acts of protest and civil disobedience.
Exorbitant administrative costs, civil actions, penalty enhance-

ments, and other liabilities threaten speech, assembly, and petition
rights as well as underlying First Amendment values. Perhaps the
most concerning development has been a band of new civil actions
whose labels-"negligent protest," "riot boosting," "conspiracy to
protest," and "tortious petitioning"-are strongly suggestive of the
First Amendment threats they pose. These actions would impose ruinous civil liabilities on protest organizers and activists. They threaten to

chill public contention that is necessary to awaken the public to racial
and other forms of injustice.
375 Compare Conn v. Bd. of Educ., 586 F. Supp. 2d 852, 860-61 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (tenured
teachers were engaged in activities protected under First Amendment when, while off-duty and
acting as private citizens, they made speeches at school board meetings, participated in march,
and participated in lawsuit to protest school closings), with Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 701
(9th Cir. 2005) (upholding discipline of professor who attended WTO protests with her students,
contrary to school administrators' guidance).
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The Supreme Court has imposed a special obligation on lower

courts to ensure that liabilities are clear, precise, and apply only in
very narrow circumstances to culpable non-expressive activities. The
most recent civil actions fail to live up to these standards. Courts

should reject these civil liability theories. Traditional costs of dissent,
including penalty enhancements, punitive damages, and some administrative costs also deserve a much closer look. Even if precedents do

not clearly require they be invalidated, support for First Amendment
values requires that they be subject to close scrutiny. Similarly, courts
ought to ensure that loss of educational and employment opportunities do not become regular costs of engaging in protest.
Just as importantly, public officials should stop seeking to pile
onto the costs of dissent or shift the costs of protest onto those who
cannot afford to bear them. Agencies and legislatures ought not to

respond to the most recent mass protests with yet another flurry of
enhanced penalties and cooked-up causes of action. Containing the
rising costs of dissent does not entail absolving protesters of liability
for their own violent or unlawful conduct. The costs of dissent are
accumulating precisely because officials and courts are applying and

imputing unwarranted costs to protesters. As part of its robust commitment to dissent, the First Amendment appropriately allocates most
of the costs of protest to the public.

